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AID CONDITIONALITIES AND PRESS FREEDOMS 
The inclusion of aid conditionality requirements has become a common practice 
within the arena of global relief and development programs. The literature on such 
programs typically focuses upon the effectiveness of monetary dispersments in terms of 
economic development (McMillan 2011, Boone1996), and in doing so disregards the 
underlying efficacy, or influence, of the attached conditionalities upon grant seeking / 
holding countries. Yet, it is critical to also understand any effects that are related to 
institutional constraints, as they may, or may not, have implications for the cultivation of 
transparency, support for democratic principles and general power sharing within grantee 
nations. It may be that these constraints create real gains in terms of goals such as public 
transparency and democratization. Alternatively, it may be that these conditions are 
merely paper-tiger rules that do not affect meaningful variance within political 
development. 
A primary example of an aid conditionality statement is an institutional rule that 
seeks to promote transparency and independence within a grantee state’s media context. 
For example standards promoting more robust press freedom have routinely been 
included among the accompanying conditionalities of the foreign aid agreements of the 
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20th century foreign aid paradigm and it continues today (Kumar 2006). Donor countries, 
seeking to encourage political development alongside economic improvements, have 
frequently introduced such requirements within the boilerplate of their agreements. 
Similarly, the World Bank has funded the Media Map (Nelson Susman Pena 2012) 
project to understand the potentially endogenous relationship between a free media 
environments and economic development. This particular project focuses on the critical 
aspect of media development and the costliness of information, which is inherently a 
contributor to efficient economic exchange. Thus, these condition statements may serve 
as a way to increase, or multiply, the underlying effectiveness of economic oriented 
funding. 
Despite the potential for dual fold improvement and synergy, it is clear that aid 
agreements are not equally effective (McGillivray 2003:8). Some grantee state should 
potentially benefit, but they continue to lag both in economic aspects and in their respect 
for human rights and support for democratic institutions (Knack2004, Goldsmith 2001). 
This is particularly the case for Sub-Saharan Africa countries like Ethiopia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda. This is a region and a set of states that has 
historical lag in terms of economic and political development, but also an established 
history of international aid support. 
My thesis project therefore seeks to evaluate the propensity of press freedom 
conditionality statements to affect real changes in observed media freedoms within the 
elections found in two Sub-Saharan African contexts – Ethiopia and Mozambique. In 
particular, I am interested in whether press freedom conditionalities associated with 
USAID agreements have meaningful implications. Countries in Africa have provisions in 
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their constitution to advance press freedom. African countries also receive aid with press 
freedom conditionalities, however, they vary in their press freedom scores and their 
advancement in press freedom over the last 16 years. Although scholars certainly debate 
whether conditionalities have any effect on the strength of democracy broadly speaking 
(Uvin 1993), little attention is directed at exploring more narrow relationships that may 
exist between grant conditionalities and specific institutions, such as press freedom, and 
its role in democratic processes. This paper focusses on press freedom conditionalities by 
looking at unquantifiable factors that can better explain the success of press freedom 
directed aid conditions in sub-Saharan Africa. The findings suggest that the nature of the 
relationship between the donor country and the receiver and also the degree of 
independence of the judiciary especially judicial review matters. 
THE ORIGINS OF THE USE OF AID CONDITIONALITIES 
The incorporation of conditionality requirements (i.e., primarily economic ones) 
began after World War II  and provided new incentives for grantee nations to implement 
reforms that would help bring them closer to the global community. The World Bank and 
the IMF – the premiere institutions in the distribution of global economic aid – began 
introducing new forms of conditionality requirements during latter half of this period they 
call structural adjustment (Easterly 2003).  
Ironically, conditionalities seems to have been a response to those challenges 
encountered on the economic development front. Conditions imposed by the World Bank 
and the IMF too often were seen as hurting local economies more than they were helping 
(Harrigan, Mosley 1991). World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs 
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previously had included condition statements that focused upon economic adjustment and 
not political reforms. Although it clearly can be said that political and economic 
conditions are in some sense related, the ineffectiveness of economic conditionalities in 
the 1980s led donor countries to move toward a new emphasis on political 
conditionalities in the 1990s (Emmanuel 2009). Donor countries and governmental 
agencies, such as USAID, began incorporating new political conditionalities. Such 
requirements were first applied in Latin America with moderate success (Brown 2004). 
These practices were later adapted to sub-Saharan Africa in order to foster development. 
 Bratton and van de Walle (1997) found that the political conditionalities of this 
period were not wholly effective in promoting democratization, but that conditionalities 
to some extent influenced the liberalization of political institutions within grantee 
countries. Conditional statements also helped engender multiparty elections and 
encouraged some aspects of political freedom in authoritarian African countries. Not 
surprisingly, then, the application of the strategy has tended to incrementally increase 
throughout the Cold War period. Still, the resulting influence of the application of these 
conditions remains somewhat ambiguous. Today, countries shift between the ex-ante and 
ex-post application of conditionalities with an intention of spreading democratic norms. It 
is, however, important to also consider the endurance of any of these positive effects, 
because, if anything, democratization seems to be regressing within sub-Saharan Africa 
over the last decade1. If institutional aid conditions are going to be a contributing element 
within the democratization process, it is crucial to better understand their narrow effects 
                                                          
1 "Freedom in the World." Historical Data-Comparative Scores for All Countries from 1973 to 2015. N.p., 
2015. Web. 24 Dec. 2016. 
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using specific grantee states as case studies (Eckstein 2000). Perhaps this type of 
knowledge is even more crucial today given the availability of largely condition-free aid 
from China and other non-democratic donor countries. 
Certainly aid to developing countries is provided with the intention of affecting 
positive change and reform efforts within grant-seeking countries. The effectiveness of 
that aid and associated conditions that are attached most likely depends on the relative 
magnitude of the donor and the amount of power they can exert within the international 
realm (Svensson 2000). This project will focus on one of the largest single sources of 
funding – USAID.  
In 2014, USAID distributed $10 billion in economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa 
countries.2 U.S. motivations when allocating these amounts may not be purely altruistic, 
however, as Berthelemy (2006) shows that former colonial countries tend to be more 
egotistic with respect to their intentions. Although the European Union also has an 
organization that controls the distribution of international aid, USAID is the largest single 
donor to poor countries. Given that the United States has few colonial ties within Sub-
Saharan Africa (other than Liberia), it tends to maintain a more neutral relationship with 
African grant seekers (especially when compared to European countries).  
Establishing environments that are able to maintain sustained economic growth is 
at the core of the USAID mission. However, the U.S. has stipulated other concomitant 
goals such as strengthening human rights institutions. A seminal part of this initiative has 
taken the form of the promotion of independent and/or free media outlets. The USAID 
                                                          




Media Assistance Program in sub-Saharan Africa consists of routine diplomatic pressure 
upon those countries receiving aid. The U.S. can, and will, leverage aid relationships and 
lobby grantee countries to prevent the harassment of journalist or to encourage the 
distribution of independent media content (e.g., Lesotho in July 2016).3 It also offers 
training to journalists in order to improve the quality of news content and provides 
funding to promote the creation of new media outlets within sub-Saharan Africa (Kumar 
2004). For example in 2010, USAID funded a substantial media program within the 
Democratic Republic of Congo to improve professionalism, enhance economic 
sustainability, and improve the legal and regulatory environment (Mottaz 2010).  
The U.S. likewise will issue official policy statements and at times threaten to 
block grant disbursements in the context of media repression. It offers help to countries in 
order to advance the development of independent media that can act as a check on 
authority and it encourage countries receiving aid to increase the prevailing level of 
transparency and accountability measure by relaxing obstructive laws and regulations.4It 
often urges countries to rescind their laws for libel (e.g., the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in 2014) and it lobbies for the release of imprisoned journalists (e.g., those 
recently jailed in Somalia).5 To buttress these intentions, the United States also enacted 
the Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act of 2009 that forces bureaucrats to monitor and 
evaluate the level of press freedom within annual aid reporting. It utilizes this information 
                                                          
3 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/260119.htm 
4 Other countries such as those in European Union put human rights at the forefront of their aid agreements reflections 
such as the Cotonou agreements (Gathii 2013)4. The Cotonou agreements also introduces human rights criteria in their 
agreements. However, it does not make human right binding to the other pillars of the accords. Dictators seem to have 
found a way around many of the conditions imposed to them. Press freedoms represent a challenge to them and a 




to determine whether donor countries are truly making an effort to promote press 
freedom or are participating in the harassment and jailing of journalists. 
The USAID approach to aid allocation emphasizes collaboration with local forces 
making it one of the better resources for development aid (Bertelemy 2006). 
Nevertheless, USAID is not the only potential source of grants-in-aid to Sub-Saharan 
African countries. Despite the large scale of this single program, other countries are also 
engaging in these same activities. Given the multitude of possible aid agreements, 
wherein countries are receiving different amounts from different donors, grantee states 
can find themselves in competing constraints associated with the strings attached to 
alternative funding sources. Receiving countries in such situations will tend to focus on 
the more lucrative, or more powerful, donor. This can establish levels of conflict with 
Western powers and alternative sources of funding such as China. These differences in 
goals and constraints are why it is important to study the effect of USAID aid conditions 
within countries that are both highly dependent and potentially exposed to contrary 
pressure from more authoritarian states. 
 
AID PARADIGMS AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA  
In recent years, a general reversal in global democratization has tended to take 
place. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, has experienced a steep decline in the prevailing 
level of democratization across the continent. Due to the presence of Chinese investment 
and the involvement and an evolving fight against radical terrorism, African countries are 
experiencing a new period of insularity from Western pressure and to some extent a 
8 
 
change in focus on the level of democratization (Diamond 2014). This reversal increases 
the importance of foreign aid and the conditions that are supposed to enhance its 
effectiveness. This section addresses the historical patterns in aid allocation from the end 
of WWII to the beginning of the 21st century. It will begin by focusing on the early stages 
of aid allocation, continue through the structural adjustment plans of the 1970s and 
conclude with an explication of the changing aid environment of the 1990s. 
     Early focus on Aid Allocation 
Aid to developing countries certainly is not a new phenomenon. During colonial 
eras, former colonies were often the subject of aid for development. Aid was given both 
before and after independence and this aid was frequently associated with policy 
concessions for the receiver state. Giving aid to former colonies was a way for imperial 
powers to help the countries became economically independent. However, the policy 
concessions often proved to have the opposite effect, making grant seeking former 
colonies more dependent on their imperial counterparts (Stokke 1987).  
      The Logic of Cold War aid in Africa 
The primary sources of international aid during the Cold War were the United 
States, the IMF, and the World Bank. The IMF and the World Bank maintained structural 
adjustment programs in order to help grantee countries develop mature and functioning 
market economies (Easterly 2005). A number of different types of aid were disbursed 
through such programs during the Cold War, but at least initially economic and military 
aid were the primary categories. The World Bank was the primary avenue for funds 
specifically addressed for economic aid (Dollar and Svensson 2000). Whereas Western 
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powers such as the USA, were more often directly tied to the distribution of military 
assistance in order to maintain stronger control of force capability. The USA, did 
however, provide some economic aid during that period with goals that run largely 
similar to those that exist today. Generally, the goals underlying this aid were to promote 
stability through democracy and economic development (Poe and Meernik 1995). 
During the Cold, War aid was proposed mainly by European countries to their 
former colonies (with the exception of the United States). By 1970, aid programs went 
through a period of alteration with the funding more often focused upon economic and 
political reforms that were intended to achieve levels of economic convergence in 
historically lagging areas of the world. This revision has been referred to as the first 
generation of aid (Stokke 1995). At this time, Western countries also viewed foreign aid 
as a source of leverage and a means to obtain diplomatic support and market ties to third 
world countries (Mosley 1987; Stoke 1995). Boschini & Olofsgård (2007) found that 
Western countries frequently gave assistance to countries that were perceived as a threat 
or that were seen as susceptible to the socialist appeals of the Soviet Union. Thus, foreign 
aid was very much about a bipolar international power structure, and disbursements was a 
part of the tension that tended to exist within the broader system.  
Because third world countries essentially had the binary choice between a U.S. 
alliance or the Soviet bloc, development disbursements often pulled from both the 
economic development pool and available military assistance. Economic aid was thus 
closely tied to military aid during this period (Poe and Meernik 1995). For instance, 
within the former Zaire and Angola, grants of economic aid usually came with promises 
of military support against communist rebels that were engaged in insurrections against 
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the regime. Thus, aid agreements tended to take on the form of guns and butter and not 
one or the other. 
     Economic assistance 
During the 1970’s economic crisis, OPEC production agreements instigated a 
period of rapid inflation in the price of oil, which engendered a cascade of economic 
recession throughout the developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa and South America 
(Adelman 1972). In the context of rapid inflation, economic disequilibrium and popular 
disruptions, many countries resorted to the credit markets to balance budgets and help 
counteract market volatility. Borrowing money to fix endemic structural problems, 
however, is generally not the best solution. In fact it tended to compound the problem 
because countries were often unable to pay back their debt according to schedule, 
creating huge interest obligations that further crippled their economies (Dollar and 
Svensson 2000, Harrigan and Mosley 19991). 
In an attempt to counteract this downward cycle, the IMF created structural 
adjustment programs that frequently introduced conditional obligations. Essentially, it 
offered money to emerging countries under the condition that they adopt a series of 
economic policies that would help them regroup and hopefully gain the stability 
necessary to be able to pay their debt on time. These conditional requirements addressed 
liberal trade policies, general resource mobilization, the efficient use of existing resources 
and other institutional reforms (Mosley 1987).  
The institutional innovations in these structural adjustment situations were 
economic and not political per se (Harrigan and Mosley 1991). They might call for the 
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improvement of the efficiency of public enterprises or create support for agriculture and 
different industry subsectors. For example, African countries were often forced to 
privatize national organizations, devaluate their currencies, and reduce their public 
workforce (Nellis 2005). These structural adjustment programs can be thought of as 
attempts by the World Bank and the IMF to transition countries from insular economies 
with trade protections toward outward-looking market economies. According to the 
World Bank, outward-looking economies would better integrate these countries into the 
existing international system, which in turn would help them improve their living 
standards and fight poverty (Mosley 1991). In most cases, these policies proved 
unsuccessful, but they remained a prescription for new countries experiencing economic 
crisis. 
Structural adjustment policies tended to fail for a number reasons. First, they 
forced countries to reduce their workforce, which exacerbated market disequilibrium. For 
example, From 1986 to 1996, six African countries (i.e., Benin, the Central African 
Republic, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, and Uganda) shed more than 10 percent of their 
civil service workforce as a result of the structural adjustment programs (Moyo 2009). 
These policies also tended to reduce local industries’ control over the prices of their core 
products and thus profit levels were eroded in the face of foreign competition. Further, 
the process of devaluing local currencies acted to increase levels of poverty and 
inequality, making the programs widely unpopular (Nellis 2005; Herbst 1990). 
 Poor countries in debt really had no choice but to abide by these rules in order to 
continue to obtain much needed foreign aid. The eventual failure of these structural 
adjustments eventually led African countries into vicious cycles where, in order to 
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survive, they were obliged to borrow money and abide by the conditions that were 
drowning their economies (Herbst 1990, Loxley 1990). Alternative international aid 
donors tended to follow in lock step with the World Bank and the IMF. Thus, structural 
adjustment was the only possible policy outcome for those countries seeking outside 
funds to deal with real economic dilemmas. 
 Ultimately, the success of these one-size-fits-all policies depended on the strength 
of institutional authority already in place within the grant seeking states. Because these 
policies represented difficult implementation problems, eventual outcomes typically led 
to major labor share reductions that created even more capital flow increases (Pastor 
1987). Between 1980 to 1999 most of the countries receiving aid from the IMF (e.g., 
Cote d'Ivoire, Togo and Mali) still were experiencing negative growth rates (Easterly 
2003). That decline often meant that elites in these countries where were able to adjust 
and even profit from these policies. Still, majorities of the poor in these settings were 
getting poorer and that was unsustainable over the long run. Scholars such as Bueno de 
Mesquita & Smith (2011), Djankov, Dutta, Leeson, & Williamson (2013) found that 
international aid and structural adjustment often would help consolidate the autocratic 
structures dominated by the elite, which maintained control of the distribution of 
resources for purposes of patronage. 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) and Santino (2001) also highlight these types of 
failures. They found that economic aid and conditionalities were not effective in poor 
countries, especially those located in sub-Saharan Africa, but that aid was relatively more 
effective in those countries possessing better respect for human rights and less prevalent 
corruption. Thus the World Bank began to identify good governance as the issue at the 
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root of Africa’s economic troubles. The emerging theory was that the poor quality of 
institutions, the weak rule of law, absence of accountability, tight control over 
information, and crippling levels of corruption were to blame for lagging African track 
records (Brautigam and Knack 2004). Similarly, Dollar and Svensson (1998) suggested 
that public institutions were crucial for the successful implementation of reform 
programs. A country’s institutions and political features, including the level of 
democratization in a country, can largely predict the successful repayment of loans.  
Restricted by its mandate, the World Bank and the IMF decided to limit its efforts 
to the economic dimension of governance and in turn to leave the political issues to other 
donor institutions (Santino 2001, Nanda 2006). The World Bank worked in collaboration 
with donor countries in order to determine what kind of conditionalities should be applied 
to the grantee countries. Institutions like USAID followed in the wake of these steps and 
began to place new emphasis on aid condition requirements (Nanda 2006).  
     Political Conditionalities in the 21st Century  
The first wave of political oriented conditionalities began in the 1990’s and was 
largely ineffective because of the lack of coordination between the donors and the fact 
that donor countries were not implementing full agreements (Brown, 2005; Crawford, 
1997, 2001; Stokke, 1995). Aid conditionality has begun to take different forms within 
the 21st century context. Now, they are more specific, and donor countries are more 
invested in monitoring countries. There are two types of conditionalities used in the 21st 
century- ex-post and ex-ante conditionalities. 
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Under ex-post conditionalities, conditions are used as a way to evaluate and select 
those countries that are worthy of funding. Programs such as the Millennium 
Development Goals and a number of European countries utilize the technique. They only 
disburse amounts to those countries that reach a certain level of development. It is 
thought that this makes their aid relatively more effective and at the same time gives a 
strong incentive for countries to take critical steps and insure a commitment from the 
state entity (Svensson 1999; Santiso 2001). 
The other way countries use political conditionalities is ex-ante. With ex-ante 
conditional requirements are used to leverage future political change. These types of 
requirements often have to be implemented before the continued disbursement of 
intervals of support take place. They require close cooperation between the donor country 
and the receiver. In terms of effectiveness, Dollar & Pritchett (1998) and Molenaers et al. 
(2015) found that the level of uncertainty between the selection and maintenance of aid 
agreements provides available leverage for future policy change. Because selection 
comes with strings attached and the incentives exist to make improvements in public 
institutions to keep aid funding pipelines open. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE LOGIC OF AID CONDITIONALITIES  
The conditionality statements attached to foreign aid agreements represent the 
operationalization of North’s (1990) institutional theory of the role that transaction costs 
play within society. He tackles the dilemma of economic convergence across the global 
economic system, or in reality, the lack thereof. According to North, neoclassical theory 
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and international trade stipulates that countries’ economies should act to converge as they 
trade goods and services and more importantly adopt efficient market practices. Since 
emerging countries’ economies are relatively small, they have the potential to grow much 
faster than rich countries whose growth rates are diminished by the larger scale of their 
economies. By adopting best practices, poor countries should be able to reach the 
economic efficiency of other countries over time. This convergence, unfortunately, does 
not occur in a uniform manner.  
The observed difference in the ability of different countries to converge led North 
(1990) to study the phenomenon. His answer to the dilemma of the lack of convergence 
was found in the role that institutions play in economic development. Institutions, as 
North defines them, are the rules, laws, habits, and customs that govern a society. North, 
then, seeks to understand how variance in the institutional structure of different societies 
influences whether goods and services are efficiently distributed. In his effort to explain 
how institutions influence societies, (North 1990) focuses on the concept of information 
cost.  
Information is at the center of all interactions within a society. It is also important 
in the democratization process. For example, information about past market transactions 
is necessary for one economic actor to determine whether it is safe to conduct business 
with another (i.e., whether the party will defect or cooperate as in the prisoner’s 
dilemma). Information helps consumers identify a fair market price for products. 
Information also helps us understand and prognosticate likely future scenarios, such as 
market reactions to shortages. Since the world is not perfect, it is impossible to obtain 
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complete information about any given topic, but that type of perfect knowledge is at the 
heart of the econometric theories that predict economic convergence over time. 
Information cost is just one a component of transaction costs that prevail within a 
society. For North (1990), transaction costs also comprise the cost of the protective rights 
and policing agreements. Hill (1990) associates these types of costs with the need to 
negotiate, monitor and enforce a contingent contract claim to ensure against the 
possibility that the contract is broken. If property rights do not exist, or the monitoring 
process is flawed, then transaction costs are unnecessarily inflated. Market exchanges 
tend to include the total production cost of a product as well as the costs of protecting and 
enforcing property rights for purchased goods and services. Minimizing these costs is 
critical to the development of a society. When these transaction costs are high, and the 
available benefits for adopting strategies that are more efficient are low, then economic 
convergence will not take place. The high level of transaction costs that exist in a society 
affect the attractiveness of market convergence strategies. Having more efficient 
strategies also helps promote more diffuse power and democratic institutions. 
Good institutions allow societies to reduce the level of transaction costs and these 
institutions take different forms, such as informal and formal rules. Informal rules are 
those that naturally occur within societies, such as customs, and they are not easily 
changeable because they were created over a long period and are deeply integrated with 
existing culture. Some type of political processes, such as a legislative process, 
bureaucratic rulemaking, and judicial adjudication, create formal rules. According to 
North (1990), the purpose of these rules is to facilitate political and economic exchange. 
These rules are usually interconnected. They are designed to facilitate transactions and 
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create path-dependent ways to solve routine collective action problems. From this 
perspective, constitutions are fundamental institutions that establish the general 
boundaries of a state’s policy-making authority. They establish the process for more 
narrowly tailored policy innovations. For example, some rules may increase democratic 
representation, establish legislative oversight, and importantly for this project create 
standards of transparency. Transaction cost facilitating rules also influences laws that are 
passed in a country and the degree to which countries follow laws such as human rights 
and press freedom. 
     Transaction Costs, Transparency, and Aid Conditionalities 
According to North’s (1990) institutional theory, the root causes of countries’ 
lagging economic performance and lack of convergence can be found in the institutional 
rules of these societies. Simply put, they are states where information and transaction 
costs are high and ingrained. In sub-Saharan Africa, these path dependent transaction 
costs can be found in the prevailing level of corruption, the lack of accountability, and the 
general lack of transparency such as free media outlets. These problems are attributed to 
colonization that created extractive institutions in these countries and that also led to civil 
war after these countries gained independence (Bertocchiand Canova 2002).  Tanzi and 
Davoodi(2000), for example, find that corruption cripples enterprise growth by 
misappropriating talent and funds that drain money out of more efficient small 
enterprises. Corruption also lead to a mishandling of taxes, with inordinate tax burdens 
distributed across society and the misallocation of the revenues. These situations act as an 
inefficient status quo that deters economic exchange and the benefits of converging 
economic strategies.  
18 
 
Along these lines, transaction cost theory suggests that these lagging countries 
must begin to change their institutional rules in order to plant the seeds of future 
economic convergence. International assistance programs thus have started to tie 
conditionalities to aid agreements that seek to foster substantive changes in institutional 
rules that potentially have long run future benefits. By adhering to these new standards, it 
is believed that receiving countries will effectively reduce the prevailing level of 
transaction costs over time and that the resulting lower transaction cost environments will 
allow market mechanisms to work. It is hoped that fundamental changes in rules that 
lower information and transaction costs will help these societies become efficient enough 
that market forces will engender measures of economic convergence. 
Conditionalities are designed to create an incentive for the receiving country to 
initiate changes that it would not otherwise. Findings within the development literature 
(Brautigam and Knack 2004) suggest that inefficient institutions, such as a weak rule of 
law, a general absence of accountability, the secretive control of public information, and 
high levels of corruption are crippling African countries. Dollar and Svensson (1998) 
have similarly found that institutions are critical to the success of economic reform 
programs. They suggest that the underlying success of loan programs can largely be 
predicted through an evaluation of a country’s institutional context (i.e., market 
conditions and political features such as the level of democratization).  
 What institutions do we take into account? This project is interested in 
transparency and press freedoms because they are so central to the other institutional 
rules and regimes that may govern economic convergence (e.g., open markets and 
popular influence, etc.). In particular the question of the conditions under which aid and 
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political conditionalities can improve press freedom. Without a strong degree of press 
freedom, it is difficult for any authoritarian country to move in the direction of economic 
convergence.  
Aid conditions are designed to increase institutional accountability by forcing 
countries to establish and adhere to new norms of behavior, such as freedom of the press, 
independent judiciaries, and fair elections. Of these institutional rules, press freedoms 
tend to be critical elements within the prevailing level of transaction costs of a society. A 
free press acts to increase the accountability of the government and to target corrupt 
practices (Besley, Burgess and Prat 2001). It can create environments that encourage 
foreign investment and spur business transactions.  
Because information is so vital to business and markets, a free press is a 
prerequisite for establishing legitimate and eventually efficient transactions. When these 
types of exchanges begin to routinely take place, the adoption of best practices and 
international standards tends to take place, and these lagging economies begin the long 
process of integration into global markets. 
Press freedoms are in turn predicated upon the level of transparency that exists 
within a society. Transparent institutional norms help countries develop because they 
dramatically reduce information costs. In developing countries, these norms are even 
more critical because they can forestall the appropriation of power and help push the 
process of democratization forward. Transparent institutions similarly can create better 
bureaucratic institutions that help development. Mauro (1995), for example, found that 
counties with less bureaucratic efficiency tend to stall development. 
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Together, transparency and a free press can substantially reduce transaction costs 
and facilitate better exchanges with other countries. With institutional rules that lower 
transaction costs and facilitate mutually beneficial trade, lagging countries can begin the 
slow process of convergence with Western economies and potentially improve the 
livelihoods of their citizens. 
 
EFFICACY OF AID AND CONDITIONALITIES 
In a previous section, I discussed the historical origins of international aid 
allocation to poor countries. I explained the different paradigms of aid distribution to 
African states, with the contemporary era of aid politics focused upon setting good 
governance standards to create political reforms that further the effectiveness of financial 
support. The following section discusses the findings of the research focused upon the 
effectiveness of this approach. 
 In general, the foreign aid literature (e.g., Dollar and Svensson 1998; Brautigam 
and Knack 2004) suggests that foreign aid works better in those environments that favor 
the effective distribution resources. Unfortunately, these types of conditions are only 
rarely met and other proxy variables have also been wanting. For a long time donor 
countries associated good institutions specifically with the idea of multiparty elections 
(Resnick 20012:5). However, research has shown that, in isolation, multiparty elections 




The failure of these expectations to deliver sustained results has eventually led to 
consideration of other smaller rule changes such as those employed in aid conditionality 
statements. Most of the literature on these conditionalities focuses upon the general 
effects of aid to economic development or democratic reforms (Knack 2004, Finkel, 
Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2007, Easterly 2003). Although research designs and 
conclusions vary, the general consensus within this literatures that aid dependency is not 
good for grantee countries and that aid conditions do not work (Svensson 1995, 
Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009; Moyo 2009).  
Some of the conditionality literature can be seen as somewhat dated (e.g., Hook 
1994; Barya 1993). 6 Newer literatures (Collier 2000; Svensson 2003) suggest that aid 
should be allocated on merit and not tied to conditions. However, these works rarely 
focus on the specific effects of conditionalities. Dutta and Williamson (2016), for 
example, are one of the only studies in the literature on foreign aid and media freedom.  
They do find that a positive relationship exists - aid increases press freedom – but effects 
were predicated on governance. Aid tended to prove positively related in democratic 
countries, but was ambiguous in nondemocratic countries.  
The Dutta and Williamson (2016) study does not specifically focus upon aid 
conditionalities and this is often the case. One exception, however, is Wright, Dietrich, 
Ariotti (2015) who studied foreign aid effects on judicial independence. They looked at 
                                                          
6 The literature often disregards effects related to the origins of the conditionalities. Berthelemy (2006) 
identified three types of donors egoistical, semi-altruistic and altruistic. Altruistic countries interact more 
with the receiver to get to a consensus regarding the disbursement of aid. The United States (i.e. USAID), 
which is the single largest donor, is considered a semi-altruistic country. Due to the size of aid disbursed by 





the effects of conditional statements on judicial reforms following the disbursement of 
aid and found a positive effect excepting in election year situations. Thus there is a 
relatively open space within the research environment to study the narrow effects of aid 
conditionalities on realized press freedoms.  This relatively concise look at the topic can 
be useful in furthering our understanding of whether or not press oriented conditionalities 
are effective in terms of helping establish a foothold for other reforms. 
     Theories of Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness 
The focus on political conditionalities starts with the introduction of good 
governance reforms. Breton Woods’s institutions took notice of the political constraints 
that were impeding the appropriate use of foreign aid and donor countries needed a novel 
concept to introduce to their constituencies that would justify the giving of aid (Stokke 
1995). The literature on good governance and aid allocation usually equates human rights 
with political and civil rights. Some of them use a concept of personal integrity rights 
(Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Poe, et al., 1994) and limit their research to U.S. aid allocation. 
The literature clearly is not consistent in the definition of good governance indicators, but 
is generally concerned with a similarly vague standard of effectiveness. 
At times the relationships seem to emerge. Trumbull and Wall (1994) introduce a 
political/civil rights variable in the estimation of the effectiveness of aid flows and found 
a positive relationship between the two. Neumayer (2002; 2003) used a similar strategy 
while distinguishing between bilateral and multilateral aid sourcing. His results suggest 
that countries that are more likely to respect civil rights and that have improving respect 
for personal integrity are positively related to that receipt and allocation of aid.  
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These studies may exhibit some aspects of being case specific. Most studies on 
the effect of human rights and bilateral aid focus particularly on the United States as the 
funding source (Poe 1992 Apodaca and Stohl 1999). Relatively fewer studies focus on  
other donors and some of these studies (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Schroeder et al. 
1987) do not focus on the development of rights but rather on other needs of the recipient 
countries and conflicts between the economic interests. Still other studies, consider non 
U.S. funding (Svensson 1999; Alesina and Dollar 2000), but results tend to be 
ambiguous. These latter studies, found lower levels of respect for human and political 
rights on the basis of aid allocation. Alesina and Dollar (2000) did find, however, that 
countries that democratize tend to receive relatively more in aid. 
     Impact of Political Conditionality on Aid Effectiveness 
Political conditionalities were intitally viewed as effective by those scholars first 
interested in the topic (e.g., Robinson 1993; Healey, et al. 1993; Baylies 1995). These 
studies saw conditionality and possibility of sanctions for noncompliance as a means for 
Western countries to induce political reform within African countries. The eventual result 
of the introduction of political conditionalities was considerably less clear. Moyo (2009) 
identifies a general compliance problem and suggests that aid continues to flow to those 
countries where conditionalities are disregarded. She also argues that the democratic 
institutions and reforms associated with these conditional statements actually do little to 
help development.  
Nonetheless, the research literature seems to widely agree that the effectiveness of 
any aid depends upon the relationship between the donor and the receiver (Crawford 
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1997; Alesina and Dollar 2000). The primary issue appears to be that these 
conditionalities are viewed as punitive and reactive – donor countries will punish 
receivers if they do not respect human rights or let their resistance to democratization 
drop (Stokke 1995 and Uvin 1993). Clearly, the intention is for donor countries to use 
these conditionalities as an incentive for political change. In the end, the eventual 
effectiveness of the aid may not depend upon the strength of the receiving government, 
but rather upon the commitment of the donor institution to punish the grantee countries 
when they fall short (Burnell 1994; Crawford 1997). Of course the issue of capacity is 
relevant in this context as well. Robinson (1993) and Baylies (1995) find that countries’ 
inherent capacities strongly predict the eventual success of political conditionalities. 
Some scholars also found targeted investment in democracy to be effective ( Finkel et al ; 
Scott and Steele 2011). Both of them studied the effect of USAID democracy assistance. 
 Along these lines, the literature,(Baylies 1995) tends to be concerned that donor 
organizations get diverted from their original goals. One of the frequent concepts 
employed in this research is the concept of ownership – a willing assumption that 
stipulates the grantee countries will respect the conditions and carry them out because 
they believe in their effectiveness (Humphreys and Sandbu 2007; Dreher 2009). 
Ownership is the probability that the receiving country will embrace the policies and is 
considered essential to the success of conditionalities by some scholars (Paloni and 
Zanardi 2004. Burnell 1994). 
The literature in general the literature has a mixed review of the effectiveness of 
conditionalities and targeted aid. Targeted investment in democracy however was seen as 
more effective while USAID was studied. Despite these finding there has been a 
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discrepancy in press freedom and advancement in press freedom in sub-Saharan Africa in 
the last 2 decades in Africa. The next chapter will study the reasons of the variations in 






THE PUZZLE OF MEDIA FREEDOM AND USAID 
 USAID aid conditions are supposed to increase press freedoms, but we continue 
to observe variation (Clemens, Kenny, & Moss 2007) in capacity and freedoms 
associated with those countries receiving assistance from USAID. Some countries seem 
to be improving while others regress despite being receiving similar levels of support. 
Thus, to answer my research question about the efficacy of aid, I to explore the variation 
in cases that exemplify this puzzle. This section discusses my case selection, as well as 
my theory and hypothesis, first I provide an overview of the theory regarding USAID aid 
and press freedom. 
     The relationship between Press Freedoms and International Aid  
The study of media and democratization typically focuses on the development of 
media outlets. For most of the 1990’s, media assistances meant the creation of alternative 
media outlets within developing countries. The purpose of these assistances was to 
introduce new independent media that will in time develop enough to inform the 





In the 2000s, this practice changed and became more much more complicated. 
USAID media assistance as of today offers journalist training, legal support, funding, and 
encourages the creation of networks between different media outlets (EV, PPC 2004). 
The constituent goals and funding mechanisms have become more complex and more 
specialized compared to the 1990s when dramatic changes in the international system 
such as the fall of the Berlin Wall had taken place.  In Africa, the introduction of 
multiparty elections in part stimulated the creation of free radio and the passing of laws 
that authorize competitive journalism. Myers (2014) found that international donors 
played an important role in that transition by offering counsel, giving startup funds and 
forcing countries to adopt these laws. Donor governments began including human rights 
and press freedom in the conditionalities attached to their economic aid. The amount of 
money governments targeted to press freedom grew substantially from the 1990 to the 
2000. USAID spent $260 million dollars worldwide on media assistance during the 
decade (Kumar 2006). 
 Donor countries and agencies shifted their focus to press freedom because 
research (Norris 2006, Tettey 2001) had identified a relationship between press freedom 
democratization and economic development. Svensson and Reinikka (2003) conducted a 
study on press freedom and government accountability in Uganda and found that the free 
circulation of press had increased the effectiveness of government allocation of funds to 
schools by 60 percent. Norris (2006) found a direct relationship between press freedom 
and economic development using a panel of 180 countries in 2004. She also found a 
direct relationship between press freedom and democratization in the world.  
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Free media is associated with transparency and accountability in general (Dutta 
and Roy 2009). Press freedom is associated with good governance and human 
development. Countries with a free press are anticipated to have less corruption overall, 
more administrative efficiency, and better economic development. The effects of free 
media have numerous synergies.  It also tends to be associated with political stability 
(Dutta, Pal and Roy 2011) and furthers the circulation of aid and governmental funds in 
developing countries. Given the amount of this type of aid targeted by USAID every 
year, it is important to understand its potential influence on grantee states’ levels of press 
freedom. 
    USAID Emphasis on Press Freedom 
USAID agreements with foreign countries cover a wide variety of 
conditionalities. Some of these can be thought of as general conditions, and they concern 
items such as the respect for basic human rights, the prevention of child labor/slavery, 
prolonged detention without charges, and illegal abductions /extrajudicial killings 
(Kumar 2003). The second set of conditionalities concerns aspects of good governance. 
Good governance conditionalities seek to establish responsible and independent media 
organizations, financial disclosure standards for public officials, responsibility, and 
transparency within legislative processes. They also push grantees to pursue legal reforms 
and create mechanisms that allow free and fair elections. Those countries receiving funds 
from USAID must develop a legal framework for commercial transactions that foster fair 




Of these various USAID conditionalities, I theorize that the ones involving press 
freedoms are the most important in institutional change. In many ways, they can be seen 
as necessary conditions for the other institutional changes sought by USAID (e.g., fair 
elections, human rights, and criminal justice). Through grant conditionalities, donor 
countries can provide incentives that encourage the development of a free press that 
makes other institutional reforms possible. The rules and regulations governing the press 
are largely determined by central governments. Through aid conditionalities, USAID can 
pressure governmental actors to reduce the regulation of media content and to alter rules 
of licensing procedures to allow entry for more independent press outlets.  
Countries that receive aid from USAID are therefore subjected to the conditions 
that are present within their aid agreements. Due to the USAID commitment to promote 
accountability, the respect of human rights through close monitoring of receiving 
countries actions, and direct funds to support free and independent media, their influence 
on press freedom is likely to be more important than other countries with looser 
monitoring of activities. The receiving country dependency on aid should also influence 
their likelihood to respect these provisions. If the receiving country is not dependent on 
aid, then there is no real incentive for them to respect the provision that follows aid 
disbursement. Finkel, et al. (2007) conducted a study that focuses on USAID media 
assistance in the world and press freedom in receiving countries and found a positive 
relationship between media assistance disbursement and press freedom. 
The literature on media assistance largely focuses on the larger globe and does not 
tend to be specific to African countries (Finkel 2007; Dutta 2016). It tends to yield mixed 
results with respect to the effectiveness of assistance targeted on investment in 
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democracy (Finkel, et al 2007; Scott and Steele 2011).  Media assistance is important not 
only because it helps fund independent media organizations.  It also provides valuable 
legal counseling and networking to maintain an environment of independent media in 
sub-Saharan African countries.  
Carry and d’amour (2013) found that until recently the United States media 
assistance had been targeted to eastern European and Arab countries. African countries 
have become an emerging emphasis and they noted a pattern of exponential growth in 
media assistance to Africa. According to a study conducted by Finkel, et al. (2007) on the 
effectiveness of USAID media assistance (1990 to 2003), improvements in press freedom 
scores are positively correlated with funding. After that period, however, the average 
score of all the countries receiving media assistance from USAID tended to retrench so 
the robustness of the relationship is not clear cut.  
My study will focus on countries that receive targeted press freedom aid from 
USAID. First, because it is easy to trace and identify possible states for a comparative 
analysis.  And second, because that media assistance is tied to the USAID conditionality 
requirements.  In effect, states received specific media assistance have both of the key 
requirements to understand efficacy.  They have funding and resource put toward this 
topic and they have the institutional conditions that are tied to the financial assistance. 
     The Puzzle of USAID aid and Press Freedom  
Almost all countries in sub-Saharan Africa receive aid from USAID. These 
countries vary, however, in their prevailing levels of press freedom. Of the 15 countries 
that received USAID media assistance more than three years between 2001 and 2016, 
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54% were associated with an increase in their press freedom score (Freedom House 
2016).7  That means, however, that 46% saw a relative decrease in estimated freedom, so 
the effectiveness is rather murky.   
Of all countries receiving press freedom aid from USAID at least once, 50% of 
them saw at least some improvement. The average press freedom score of these countries 
increased by 2 percentage points during the period. Some countries such as Liberia and 
Cote d’Ivoire saw substantial improvements. Others, like Ethiopia, Senegal and Mali saw 
substantive levels of erosion during the same period. When we count only those countries 
that received targeted media development aid from USAID, the average media score was 
55.41 in 2001and incrementally increase to 57.8 in 2016.  While that might provide some 
evidence of a positive association, countries that never received media assistance from 
USAID showed the same levels of improvement (i.e., from 55.0% in 2001 to 57.5% in 
2016). This means that in total countries that receive press freedom aid conditionalities 
from USAID have better scores in general however their score is also getting worse over 
the last decade or so. What explain why some countries receiving USAID improve their 
press freedoms cores and others do not? In the upcoming sections, I will introduce 
possible explanations on the effectiveness of USAID aid assistance. 
COMPARATIVE CASE SELECTION 
To evaluate the question on the effectiveness of press freedom, I am going to use 
a simple two-country comparison and a Most Similar Systems (Lijphart 1975) research 
                                                          
7 In order to determine media assistance I gathered my dataset from the United States foreign assistance 
database. It contains data on media aid received by countries from 2001 to 2016 the amount received and 
the project it went to. 30 sub-Saharan African countries received media assistance from the United States 
between 2001 and 2016 . 15 of them receive it for more than four years. 
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design.  The comparative research design will to the best extent possible eliminate 
alternative explanations for variance in press freedoms within my pair of settings. In this 
section, I will introduce these competing explanations for press freedom that I will be 
using as selection criteria within my research design. 
 Possible explanation to aid effectiveness 
In this section I will introduce the possible explanation to aid effectiveness and 
the reason why they work and in some instances do not. These explanations are not false, 
but, explain only part of the press freedom variation in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Level of Aid Dependence 
The first possible explanation for the variation in press freedom among states 
receiving media assistance is the level of grantee country’s dependence on foreign aid. 
Scholars have studied the effectiveness of aid conditions and found that a state’s 
dependence on aid can highly influence the effectiveness of those conditions following 
aid disbursement are in terms of contratint. Pfeifer and Englebert (2002) found that aid 
conditions are more vulnerable to foreign donor pressure when they rely heavily on aid 
and when they are a primary commodity export economy. Lewintzky and Way (2006) 
also found these relationships, showing that USAID should have more power over 
countries where USAID have higher leverage. Considering that USAID is the biggest 
bilateral aid donor to Africa, USAID conditionality provisions should be more effective 
in countries that are primary product exporters and that rely heavily on foreign aid. 
There is, however, large variation in press freedom for those African countries 
highly dependent aid. Excluding failed states and countries with conflicts, such as Sudan, 
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South Sudan, and Somalia; countries that have the majority of their aid coming from 
USAID vary a lot in press freedom score improvement. Highly dependent8 countries such 
as Botswana and Ethiopia9 saw their Freedom House press freedom scores increase from 
19 to 18 percentage points respectively10. Some countries that received less than 10 
percent of their total aid from USAID, such as Congo, Brazzaville, Togo and Ghana,11 
saw rather big improvements in their press freedom scores. Furthermore, when we look at 
countries receiving media assistance from USAID, there is no pattern between countries 
dependence on USAID and the effectiveness of the media assistance in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Countries that are less dependent such as Zimbabwe are seeing a positive change 
in press freedom score, however; countries that are more dependent such as Burundi 
seem to have a more negative change in press freedom. Since dependence on aid fails to 
completely explain why media directed assistance is successful in some countries and not 
others, we must continue to examine alternative explanations, such as the strength of 
democracy in these countries. 
Strength of democracy within States 
Another possible explanation for variation in press freedom in sub-Saharan Africa 
is the strength of democracy. That is, one would anticipate stronger democracies to 
provide stronger guarantees and respect for press freedom. However, democratization is 
                                                          
8 This is expressed as USAID as a share of revenue. I have two measures for this variable; the first one is 
AID as a percentage of government expenditure and USAID as a percentage of government expenditure. 
The database on the government revenue was obtained from the IMF database on government revenue, and 
the database on the disbursement of USAID was obtained from the United States foreign assistance 
database. 
9 Botswana has an average of 51% of foreign aid coming from USAID (2001-2014). Ethiopia has an 
average of 21% of total aid coming from USAID (2001-2014). 
10 Freedom house score goes from 0 free to 100 not free. Increaaseof press freedom score means worse 
score. 
11 Ghana saw a change of 24%, Togo 12% and Congo Brazaville 12%. 
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not clearly associated with press freedom in sub-Saharan Africa. African leaders 
(democratic and authoritarian alike) are known for violating press freedom despite the 
establishment of press freedom laws in these countries. In every United States 
Department of State Human Rights Report, every African country has instances of press 
freedom violations.  
Examples of press freedom go from unlawful jailing and killing of journalists and 
closing radio stations.12 A prominent example of this can be found in Malawi –  a country 
that has been a multiparty democracy since 1994.  Malawi has seen four changes of 
leadership at the head of state level and it remain volatiles. Within this setting, issues like 
the jailing of journalist or the closing of independent radio stations are very common, 
Ociti (1999) conducted a historical analysis of the media in Africa since independence 
and noticed that even historically democratic African countries pass laws to restrict or 
punish the media, especially during election years.  
This disparity in press freedom and democratization can be seen throughout 
Africa over the last decade. Sub-Saharan Africa had eight countries with a free press in 
2001. By 2016, that number was down to three. Sixteen countries were classified as 
partly free in 2001 as compared to 26 in 2016. Twenty-one countries had a press that was 
considered not free in 2001 compared to seventeen in 2017. The average press freedom 
score of sub-Saharan Africa in 2001 was 56 compared to 58.17 in 2016. Contrarily, the 
POLICY4 database shows at least some moderate improvement. In the year 2000 19.5% 
of African countries were considered a democracy, 70.7% were classified as an anocracy, 
                                                          





and 6.9% as an autocracy.13 Twelve years later, 37.2% of sub-Saharan countries were 
considered a democracy; 55.8% were considered anocacy and 6.9% were considered as 
autocracies. Freedom House press scores for the same year that 5 countries (10%) were 
rated Free, 23 (47%) were rated Partly Free, and 21 (43 percent) were rated as not free. 
Freedom House also has a measure of democratization, however, the Freedom House 
measure of democratization includes a measure of press freedom, therefore, making it 
problematic while studying the effectiveness of press freedom on democracy. The 
strength of democracy, therefore, may not explain all the variation in media assistance 
effectiveness. A Country such as Zambia is considered a full liberal democracy by the 




Press freedom 2001 2016 
Free 8 3 
Partly free 16 26 









Democratization( polity IV) 2001 2015 
democracy 19.5% 41 
Anocracy 70.7% 47.8 
autocracy 6.9% 6.5 
 
 
Economic Capacity (Per Capita Income) 
A third possible explanation of the variation in effectiveness of press freedom aid 
is relative economic capacity as measured by income per capita. Media assistance in 
Africa has often been considered ineffective. For instance, Gicheru (2014) found that 
short-term donor country goals do not help create truly free and independent media. 
Kumar (2003) found that the effort by USAID to enhance free press in Africa in the 
1990’s was largely unsuccessful because of the inability of these media outlets to survive 
economic challenges. Advertising – one of the most important revenue sources for an 
independent media – is weak and sometimes inexistent in some African countries. In 
others, newspapers and media outlets have to secure the support of political powers in 
order to survive. A pertinent example would be the DRC, where the newspapers cannot 
be unbiased and have to secure political support in order to keep going to press.  
Securing political support prompts self-censorship in light of pressure from 
political leaders (Guy Berger 2011). In countries with elections, those newspapers that 
have an affiliation with a specific political party lack credibility and lose all financial 
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support when if their candidate loses the election. Due to the political polarization of 
news agencies in general, African governments readily use their bureaucratic powers to 
punish news agencies that do not support them (i.e., they cut funding, pressure 
journalists, jail them or create discriminatory laws against privately owned media 
outlets). Companies will consequently withdraw their advisements from any news agency 
that is criticizing the government leading to a lot of self-censure. 
In countries where the press can rely on advertisement as source of revenue, the 
lack of privatization weighs a lot on the advertising companies. Since the government 
owns most of the big banks and industrial corporations, their spending frequently is 
within the governmental domain (Djankov et al. 2003). Where the population can afford 
go pay for news consumption, media organizations, and track records of press freedom, 
tend to fair much better. Djankov et al. (2003) found that a higher income per capita is 
significantly correlated with better levels of press freedom.  
In order for media assistance to be effective, it has to be sustained over a long 
period. From 2001 to 2009, for example, the percentage of media classified as not free in 
Africa went 27 to 50. For an international organization to have any influence on the 
media, there is a need for sustained funding and pressure on the government. The 
countries with the highest gni per capita14 that media freedom assistance from USAID 
(Angola Nigeria DRC, Cote D'Ivoire and Kenya ) all saw a improved change in their 
                                                          
14 Gni per capita 
I have obtained my measure of GNI per capita from the World Bank database. In the list of countries 
receiving media aid from USAID, the top 5 countries with the highest gni per capita have seen positive 
changes in their press freedom scores between 2001 and 2016. The only countries with 500 dollars or less 
of GNI per capita, Zimbabwe Mozambique Sierra Leone and Liberia are the only one with positive changes 




press freedom scores from 2001 to 2016. However, countries like Liberia and Ethiopia 
who have similar income per capita saw different changes in press freedom score during 
the period of 2001-2016. Liberia score decreased by 19 while Ethiopia score worsened by 
22.But, Uganda’s and Zimbabwe that have similar income per capita saw similar 
changes. Uganda score increased by 15 while Zimbabwe’s score decreased by nine. 
Assessing this hypothesis for sub-Saharan Africa, the evidence only further 
highlight the puzzle. Income per capita is therefore a possible but not complete 
explanation of the disparity in the effectiveness of media directed assistance. 
The Growing Influence of China 
Another competing explanation of press freedom within Africa is the inconsistent 
signals or constraints associated with different foreign donors, especially between 
USAID and China. Unlike the U.S., the Chinese government gives aid with few, or no, 
conditions to African countries. This aid helps reduce the level of leverage or control big 
international donors have within the internal politics of grantee states. As we have 
learned (Wright 2011), aid lacking conditions often helps consolidate authoritarian 
governments and that may be seen as in China’s long term interests as it provides access 
and insures stable trade relationships.  
The track record of Chinese help to African countries (Tull 2006; Dreher and 
Fushs 2012), generally shows a regression in the ongoing process of democratization. 
The fact that the average press freedom score increased from 2001 to 2010, but that the 
number of authoritarian countries decreased during that same period, suggests that 
another actor like China may be making aid and conditionalities relatively less effective. 
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Indeed, having an electoral democracy is not sufficient anymore to show increases press 
freedom.  
In 2016, for example, Angola saw all their funds from the U.S. frozen due to anti-
gay laws. The government, however, proceeded to retain the controversial policies and 
disregarded the sanctions. Angola receives a lot of funds and loans from the Chinese 
government too and the lack of binding constraints from the East may be supplanting 
USAID attempts to initiate institutional reforms. The Angolan government was said to 
have broken off talks with the IMF in order to receive more than $2 billion in soft loans 
from China in 2005 (Reisen 2007). They ended up receiving more than 12 billion dollars 
(Brautigam and Hwang 2016) of aid during the period between 2001 and 2014. 
These Chinese funds increasingly are available to sub-Saharan countries allowing 
them to pose resistance to Western pressure. China is now eroding traditional forms of 
leverage by taking the initiative to support countries unconditionally and sometimes even 
rogue states. In 2002, for example, Chinese oil companies took over the production of oil 
in Sudan after Canadian and Swedish companies were pressured by the international 
community to leave the country. China is also taking further steps in their foreign aid 
policy by forgiving more than $2.13 billion in debt for 44 countries (31 of which are 
African). Further, it is in the process of and making plans to forgive an additional $1.28 
billion. By 2005, it is reported that China canceled a total of 10 billion dollars in debt 
owed by 31 African countries and it vowed to open a zero-tariff trade with the continent 
(Woods 2008).  
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China also is financing infrastructure in these same African countries. Chinese 
financing for infrastructure went from being insignificant in 2000 to representing 20 
percent of the total External Infrastructure Investment Commitments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2012 (Gutman, et al. 2015). This heightened level of aid from China is 
weakening the Western authority that aid organizations have exerted in the African 
context. These countries are now able to finance development projects while maintaining 
central authority and violating fundamental rights, such as the freedom of the press and 
free speech.  
Chinese aid also tends to be elite oriented, thus while the dollars continue to flow 
the beneficiaries are quite different than in the past. African governments feel less 
constraint with respect to these rights and regimes can use Chinese funds to develop some 
basic institutions and secure the critical support of elite actors. By securing these 
commitments, African governments are in a sense becoming less centralized with respect 
to authority, but there is ample grip on the reins of power to violate basic rights without 
major repercussions. 
The China hypothesis is fascinating and may play a growing role in the area of 
press freedoms.  Clearly, it does not explain all the observed differences in the success of 
media assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. However, countries that receive more assistance 
from China, such as Angola ($21 billion) Kenya ($5 billion) did indeed see their levels of 
press freedom worsen.   Thus it remains a viable explanation of variance. 
Consistency of Media Assistance 
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One of the critical reasons that media assistance failed in the 1990s is the lack of 
consistency in the disbursement of aid (Kumar 2003). The previous attention to Chinese 
influence can explain how African governments economically punish independent media 
organizations and bully them. For media aid assistance to be an effective, aid to media 
needs to be consistent and the leverage afforded international donors must be relatively 
stable.  
The database on USAID media assistance in Africa proves that those countries 
that consistently receive aid are more likely to see a positive change in their press 
freedom scores. As an example, sub-Saharan African countries that receive USAID 
media assistance more consistently between 2001 and 2016 were more likely to sustain 
positive changes in press freedom. Countries like Liberia and Zimbabwe that receive 
USAID media assistance for more than ten years have seen the relative level of press 
freedom improve. Other countries also receive media assistance for less 10 years such as 
Cote d’Ivoire Kenya and Angola saw their press freedom score increase.   The 
consistency of media assistance therefore is not able to fully explain the variation in press 
freedom in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The puzzle of this study is to identify why some countries improve their press 
freedom scores and others fail to do so despite the fact that they all receive press freedom 
aid conditionalities from USAID.in   This section proposes possible explanations for the 
effectiveness of USAID media directed assistance that have not been sufficiently 
examined in prior research. I concluded that the strength of countries democracy, the 
influence of Chinese loans, income per capita and the dependency these countries have 




EXPLAINING USAID AID EFFECTIVENESS: THE ROLE OF EFFECTIVE 
MONITORING, RESPONSIVENESS AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS.  
My overall theory is that countries’ respect for and improvement in press freedom scores 
is strongly associated with the degree of donor responsiveness to violations and the 
degree of domestic protections for press freedom through judicial institutions. In 
particular, USAID conditionalities should be more effective in improving press freedom 
where donor governments take active steps to respond to receiving governments 
violations and where judicial institutions are more independent of political influence and 
can better protect press freedom. The following discussion explains the rationale behind 
these hypotheses. 
Donor Monitoring of Grantee Performance 
It may also be important to differentiate the propensity to monitor aid agreements. 
Monitoring is the degree to which donor countries are aware of the progress made by 
countries receiving aid and any shortcoming or violation of aid assistance. 
Responsiveness, on the other side, is the degree to which donor countries apply sanctions 




 One of the critiques of aid conditions has been the lack of monitoring from donor 
countries. Although media freedom is part of the conditions imposed by USAID to 
African countries, it can be difficult to reliably quantify it. One can assume that there will 
be more monitoring from USAID to countries that receive media assistance because of 
the work donors put in to the study of the media in these countries. The assistance may 
even be associated with a particular action plan, making monitoring more feasible. Given 
intermittent levels of source information, donor countries and agencies like USAID may 
react differently to violations of aid agreements and political conditionalities.  
The variation in the results of media targeted assistance might not be due to a lack 
of monitoring, but the associated lack of response from the donors. Brown and 
Raddatz(2012) studied the international community response to electoral violence in 
Kenya and found that donor country rarely punished countries that violate conditions that 
will ensure future support. Sometimes recipients of this aid also play a series of games 
with donors by using humanitarian and geopolitical conditions to avoid punishment. In 
Uganda (Fisher 2012), the government used their interventions in Somalia to keep 
receiving aid. The Ugandan government also went ahead and tied the rebel group the 
LRA to al-Qaida in order to maintain U.S. support (Fisher 2013:18).  
The United States also tends to favor specific allies in order to secure their help in 
international matters. An example of that will be the support given to the dictator Mobutu 
during the Cold War and the East African conflicts (Robarge 2014:6). Donor countries 
subsequently close their eyes on any human rights violation committed by the country 
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during that period. Donor monitoring and response thus is a viable explanation of the 
cultivation of media freedoms and shed light on the puzzle. 
Strength of Judicial Institutions 
A final possible explanation for variation in press freedom among African states 
receiving aid is the prevailing level of judicial independence. For countries to respect the 
conditions imposed by the USAID, there is a strong need for judicial independence. 
Wright (2015) found a positive relationship between the amount of foreign aid received 
by a country and the corresponding freedom of the judiciary.  
Due to the new wave of democratization started in the 1990’s, the majority of 
African countries adopted the universal declaration of human rights in their constitutions 
thus enacting provisions to enhance press freedom. Previously, the African Charter on 
Human and people’s rights was ratified in 1986.15 Governments in sub-Saharan Africa 
were also compelled to release more information to the public to promote better 
journalism (Gicheru 2014). The only obstacle in the way of these laws is the ability of the 
government to control the judiciary system, which would arbitrate failures and conflicts. 
If conditions accompanying economic assistance can influence judicial 
independence then these conditions indirectly may also influence press freedom. Judicial 
independence allows for any law that was passed in a country to be respected and give to 
limit the government’s ability to bully citizens. Juridical independence also allows for 




institutional review of laws passed in a country that will go against constitutional 
authority or the universal declaration of human rights. 
I introduced two new explanations that could explain it which are the 
independence of the judiciary and the United States responsiveness to aid treaty and 
human right violations. In the next section, I will therefore present the methodology 
employed to explore these hypotheses. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
In the previous chapter, I identified theories that might explain the effectiveness 
of USAID media directed assistance. I then proposed an alternative set of theories and 
hypothesis that might better explain the variation that are donor responsiveness and 
judicial independence. To assess the explanatory power of donor responsiveness and 
judicial independence, I will adopt a most similar systems case study methodology, 
exploring two cases that are as similar ways relevant to theoretical expectations but that 
have a different outcome in terms of their press freedom trends. Ethiopia and 
Mozambique are ideally suited for this analysis in terms of evaluating the effectiveness of 
USAID conditionality provisions. Both countries receive media assistance from USAID: 
nine years and ten projects for Mozambique and seven years and thirteen projects for 
Ethiopia.16 Both countries share an average low income per capita for the period of 2001-
2016: 297 for Ethiopia and 426 for Mozambique.17 Both countries are also very 
                                                          
16 USAID database 
17 World bank 
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dependent on foreign aid. Foreign aid represents 58% and 65% of the government 
expenditures respectively of Ethiopia and Mozambique. USAID in particular represents 
2.6% and 4.5% of their total government expenditures respectively.18 Both countries also 
receive substantial aid from the Chinese government.  
Despite such similarities, both countries are on a different scale when it comes to 
press freedom. Mozambique press freedom improved by 2 points between 2001 and 2016 
while Ethiopia press freedom worsened by 22 points. During the same period Ethiopia 
average a press freedoms score of 75.2 while Mozambique averages a press freedom 
score of 43.619. 
Election monitoring and responsiveness  
To better understand the responsiveness of press freedom in these two countries I 
am going to move beyond the indices and look to specific events to see what leverage 
they can provide on my research question. To accomplish that I must to take into account 
external and internal events happening in the countries during each period. To make my 
analysis more reliable, I decided to compare two election periods in both countries - the 
2004 and 2009 election in Mozambique and the 2005 and 2010 election in Ethiopia.  
I decided to compare election periods for different reasons. First, elections are 
highly monitored by the international community, which sends observers and media 
representatives who write extensive reports about the elections (Kelley 2012). Due to the 
                                                          
18 ( which is high compared to the average).the average united assistance as a percentage of the gni during 
the period of 2001 to 2016 is 1.5 if we exclude out layers like Somalia , sudan and countries that got out of 
was Liberia sierra Leone. 
19 Freedom house  
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critical nature of elections and their facial relationship with media freedoms, I should be 
able to understand and qualitatively assess violations of the conditions found in aid 
agreement. Such discrepancies will be more visible and thus more likely to lead to an 
official responses from international actors by donors.  
In addition, both elections occurred during the same period, so any changes in the 
policies of USAID will similarly influence both countries. Donors consider election 
behavior important and it is elemental to evaluation of democratization and future 
political stability. Elections are also sensible times in countries’ history and are more 
likely to see violations of press freedom by governments because of the important role 
media plays in elections. According to the Media Council of Tanzania, more than 75% of 
press freedom violations in Africa are election related.20 Hence, election periods are well 
suited for examining the role of donor responsiveness and other alternative explanations 
such as judicial independence in shaping countries’ adherence to USAID conditionalities.  
Countries, depending on how they are treated by the United States should react to 
election pressure in two ways. They will take measures to reduce press freedom and 
human right violation if they felt pressured by the United States. In the opposite case, 
they will disregard any condition following aid disbursement because they expect no 
sanctions. 
Independence of the judiciary  
                                                          




To examine the potential influence of the judiciary in explaining the variation in 
press freedom, I also examine how the judiciary is formed in both countries and take a 
closer look at judicial review of laws passed by the general assembly and decision made 
by government officials in both Ethiopia and Mozambique. Looking at the structure of 
the judiciary will help me understand how susceptible both Ethiopia and Mozambique 
judiciary are to government pressure and how tied the judiciary is to the party in power 
and politics. Looking at judicial review will help identify how both countries assure that 
their constitution is respected. I will also look at any major laws passed and any changes 
in the constitution that can affect both judicial review and press freedom laws during the 
period of 2001 to 2016. 
Domestic institutions and their independence from central governments are 
important in the aid literature. Like North(1994) explained,  institutions are important in 
facilitating countries development by reducing constraints; in the example of press 
freedom, the judiciary is one of the institutions that can help explain why different states 
experience different outcomes . All the African countries signed the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the African Human Rights Chart that forces them to 
include in their laws provisions to respect human rights, the freedom of information, and 
press freedom. Article 9 of the Africa Charter for Human and People’s Rights stipulates 
that every individual has the rights to receive information and express his opinion ( 
Gicheru 2014). The difference between these countries therefore can reside in the way the 
judiciary upholds these laws.  
The constitution used today by both Mozambique and Ethiopia was created at the 
beginning of the 1990’s. Both countries were under communist rule before that and 
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experienced a great deal of civil conflict. The new constitution in both countries was 
created to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Human 
Right Charter, which means that they have provisions that respect freedom of information 
and press freedom, respectively article 19 of the Ethiopian constitution and article 49 of 
the Mozambican constitution. Both countries, however, apply these laws differently. Both 
countries have a judiciary that is considered biased and under the influence of the 
executive. However Mozambique judiciary have better checks such as the Supreme 
Court, the constitutional court and the administrative courts  that have some degree of 
freedom and that can better check violations. These courts are also easily accessible in 
Mozambique compare to Ethiopia. UNESCO identified the press freedom law in 
Mozambique as guaranteed by the law and respected in practice.21 However, Ethiopia 
seems to be the opposite, having press freedom laws that are not respected in practice. In 
the following sections, I will identify the process of judicial review in both countries and 
see how it works and how it can influence press freedom. 
Why comparing both countries  
Both countries are similar because they are both heavily dependent on aid and the 
majority of their aid comes from the United States. Both countries are also close when it 
comes to income per capita. During the period of 2001 to 2016, both countries received 
media aid from USAID for seven years for Ethiopia and nine years for Mozambique. The 
same government that took power after a civil conflict and stayed in power until recently. 
                                                          




In sum, the veracity of aid conditionalities should be able to be discerned from 
state level reactions to press freedom and human right violations as well as the inner 
working of the judiciary and judicial review in both countries. The reaction of donors, 
specifically USIAD, can help understand how donors are monitoring agreements. In sum, 
both countries have laws that allow for press freedom; the question here is to understand 
why these laws are respected in one country more than the other one considering that 






In this section, I will evaluate the respect of press freedom during the 2005 and 
2010 Ethiopian general election. I will conduct an overview of each election and examine 
the degree to which the independent media is able to work in the country. I will examine 
the degree of responsiveness of the United States to violation during these elections. I 
will additionally examine laws in place in each country that allows press freedom 
provisions to be respected and see if these law played a role in the support or demise of 
press freedom in the country. 
THE ETHIOPIAN CASE 
Ethiopia was one of only two African countries that was not colonized; the 
country, however, went through periods of political turmoil that shaped its history. In 
1974, Haile Selassie the emperor of Ethiopia was ousted by a group of militarias called 
DERG. The DERG led the country from 1974 to 1991 and created a Marxist regime 
under the rule of Megitsu their leader (Marcus 2002). After a brief period under a 
communist reign, Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) started a 
revolution helped by foreign donors and was able oust the DERG in 1991. The EPRDF 
installed a transitional government and declared independence in 1993. The first election 
was organized in 1995, putting the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front 




media started flourishing after the EPRDF took power and especially when the country 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The first press law was introduced 
in the country in 1992 (Wondwosen 2009). Media outlets increased after that period, the 
major press outlets in the country were owned by the government, leading to self-
censorship and journalist harassments. In 2007 it was estimated that the country had 1500 
journalists and 300 to 400 of them work in private medias; Ethiopia also has 58 
commercial newspapers (as of April 2008, Skjerdal 2008). In 1998 Ethiopia started a 
border war with the newly independent Eritrea that officially ended in 2000, but clashes 
still happen as of today with both countries still disputing territories. Ethiopia organized 
another contested multiparty election in 2005. 
Ethiopia is a federal parliamentary republic with a bicameral parliament and an 
independent judiciary. The prime minister is elected by parliament and controls the 
legislature. The country is divided into regions that are semi-autonomous and represented 
in the national parliament. The parliament is divided into two houses; the House of 
Federation and House of People Representative. Local state councils elect the members 
of the House of Federation, which is the upper house (Abbink 2009). In my first step into 
comparing the effectiveness of USAID aid conditions, I first need to identify how USAID 
responds to human rights violations especially after contested elections.  
The 2005 Election  
The regional and parliamentary elections in Ethiopia in 2005 were considered the 
first real competitive election in the country since the EPRDF came to power in 1991 
(Teshome 2013). The EPRDF uncontested in the last two elections faced their first true 
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opposition in the coalition between two of the country’s biggest political parties the 
United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) and the Coalition for Unity and Democracy 
(CUD) (Aalen & Tronvoll 2009). The 2005 election, however, was marked by important 
post-election crackdowns on political parties and independent media. The day after the 
election, may 16 2005, the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’party the EPRDF stopped the 
vote count and declared himself head of the police and the military (Aalen & Tronvoll 
2009). They also declared a month-long ban on any demonstration and outdoor meeting. 
Preliminary results in June showed the EPRDF winning most of the seats. According to 
the Carter Center for Democracy, these results led to demonstrations that apparently led 
to a police crackdown that killed 40 people on June 6 to 8.22 The National Electoral 
Review Board of Ethiopia pushed back announcing the election result until July to let the 
situation in the country cool off and give space to opposition groups to file complaints.In 
all 383 complaint were filed, and 180 were reviewed. Irregularities were still observed 
during the review session. According to the Carter Center for Democracy; in August the 
votes were rerun in 31 constituencies; 26 of which was won by CUD; and the UEDF. The 
EPRDF ended up winning all the reruns. The final election results were delayed until 
their final publication in November 2015 giving the victory to the EPRDF, thus leading 
to a number of protests in the country. A student protest in the capital three weeks after 
the election led to 34 deaths. The opposition parties also protested these irregularities, 
accusing the EPRDF of trying to change the election results in their favor. The protest in 
                                                          





the country after the election lead to the arrest and detainment of 5000 people and mainly 
opposition members (Aalen & Tronvoll 2009). 
Ethiopia’s Media Environment 
rior to the 2005 election, the Ethiopian national electoral board issued guidelines to media 
outlets in order for them to cover the election fairly and not give an advantage to any 
political party. The media outlets were told for example to “avoid facilitating 
discrimination based on race, sex, language, religion, political or other beliefs, national or 
social origins; report only on credible and well-sourced facts.” Moreover, they were 
requested not to “hide key information or falsify documents.”(Techone 2009). State-
owned media also announced that they would give 54 percent of their election coverage 
to opposition parties. USAID, in the pre-election period noticed the difference  in media  
coverage , the harassment of journalists and the harsh media laws  in the country and 
proposed a weekly qualitative and quantitative  assessment of the media during the 2005 
election.23. 
Studies show that the media did not respect these provisions and that the state-
owned media advantaged the party in power, the EPRDF. For example, the EPRDF 
received more than double the coverage of any other political party, and they also 
received a more positive coverage compared to their opposition counterparts (Yosef 
2005).  Before election day the press enjoyed relative freedom, however, The government 
press focused on the EPRDF and the independent media focuses on the opposition party. 
Yosef (2005) found that the independent media was giving a more positive coverage of 
                                                          
23 McMahon, Edward; Stephen Beale, IFES Technical  Genet ,Menelik-Swanson, IFES Staff ‘Ethiopia Pre-
Election Assessment Report July 2004’ url : http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadc705.pdf 
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the election to opposition groups and a more negative coverage to the EPRDF. The 
government owned media was doing the opposite of independent media. 
During the turmoil following the elections, a number of journalists were jailed, 
and some of them were harassed. The Ethiopian ministry of defense gave a warning to 
Ethiopian newspapers that were writing about the crackdown and accused them of 
violating national security and initiating violence with the help of the opposition. Thus 
endangering public safety.24According to the Addis Tribune (June 2005) a government 
owned newspaper, the minister of defense accused some private media of circulating 
dozen of gossips stories about the army and threatened to sue them for tarnishing the 
army’s fame. In June 2005, for example, the Ethiopian Broadcasting Board revoked the 
licenses of five Ethiopian journalists working for Voice of America and Deutsche Welle 
because of their negative coverage of the EPRDF during the election.25 Amnesty 
International said that during the post-election turmoil in 2005, two journalists were 
given prison terms during that year and multiple journalists were arrested during the post-
election turmoil and were on bail waiting for judgment. Fifteen journalists were arrested 
during an opposition round-up in November 2005. Amnesty International also indicated 
that some of journalists arrested   have been arrested and imprisoned before due to 1992 
press laws that were reversed.26Seven journalists were charged in absentia (Lyons 
2006).The United States Human Rights Watch also indicated that the Ethiopian 
                                                          
24 Teshome B, Wondwosen. "Media And Multi-Party Elections In Africa: The Case Of 
Ethiopia". ethiosun 2009. Web. 27 Apr. 2017. 
 
25 Human Rights Wacth ethiopia report 2005 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2006/country-
chapters/ethiopia 
26 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2006 - Ethiopia, 23 May 2006, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/447ff7a62f.html [accessed 27 April 2017] 
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government cracked down on journalists and newspapers. In the post-election period, 
eight privately owned newspapers were closed and their editor in chiefs arrested27. Six 
other newspapers stopped publishing because of government crackdown or the refusal of 
the government-owned printing press to print their papers. Foreign journalists were 
arrested, and some have been expelled from the country due to their depiction of the 
Ethiopian government. The report also indicated that broadcasting licenses authorized 
two private radio to operate in the country at the beginning of the year. By the end of 
2005, none of these two private radios were broadcasting. After looking at the 2005 
elections now let's look at the 2010 election. 
After the 2005 elections in Ethiopia, the crackdown saw a lot of local newspapers 
harassed and threatened if they published any news criticizing the military and the 
government that killed almost 48 people in the May 2005 riots. The news about the riots 
were missing in the local independent news such as the Addis Zemen owned by the 
government the Anwaran times. The Ethiopian Reporter and the Addis fortune that are 
independent newspapers refrain themselves from publishing any article critical of the 
government. They however reported government announcement that any critic of the 
military will be punished and also that any covering of the opposition protest will also be 
punished and the journalist be considered as members of the opposition trying to initiate 
violence. Since the government owned the only paper printers in the country, they 
therefore were able to control any news content before it comes out. The Addis Zemen 
                                                          





went along with government accusing opposition politicians of instigating the violence 
and being responsible for the killing. 
International Accounts of the Election  
The international community was more critical of the Ethiopian government pin pointing 
the police in their violent crackdown of protests and the killing of 48 protesters. The 
Washington post of June 2005 for example accused the Ethiopian military of firing live 
ammunition in a crowd of protesters.28 The associated press also criticized these killing 
and interviews conducted by The Independent noting that the police was shooting people 
indiscriminately wounding a 7 year old girl in the process.29 
The 2005 election in Ethiopia were overall violent with apparent signs of journalist 
harassment and other press freedom violations such as jailing of journalists in the post-
election period. The next section will look at the 2010 Ethiopian elections. 
Ethiopia: The 2010 Election 
 After the 2005 elections, the Ethiopian government launched an operation to 
close down the political sphere. For example, in 2009 the Ethiopian government passed a 
law that forced any organization advocating for democracy and the freedom of the press 
to have 90 percent of their budget coming from local sources.30 In 2008 they passed the 
freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation” (HPR, No. 
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590/2008) that give the power of licensing media outlets to the minister of commutation 
instead of giving that power to an independent agency made of media professionals (Ali 
2015). Opposition leaders were jailed during that period; journalists were harassed some 
of them fled the country. The Ethiopian government created a system of surveillance that 
spread through the grassroots, forcing villagers to support the EPRDF in exchange for 
food fertilizers and other product and punishing voters that support the opposition.31 In 
October 2009, the EPRDF and minor political parties-without the presence of any major 
political party-signed an election code of conduct for political parties (Tronvoll 2010).  
Ethiopia’s Media Environment  
The 2010 election in Ethiopia was in many ways similar to the election in 2005. 
The government also tried to hinder the free flow of information in the country but in the 
period prior to the election. There were many of arrests of opposition leaders leading up 
to the election day. The government also harassed and detained a large number of 
journalists. According to Human Rights Watch, at least 13 of Ethiopia leading press 
freedom advocates fled the country in fear of repercussion.32  
Many of the country’s independent newspapers were closed for that specific 
reason notably, Addis Neger; the nation largest independent newspapers, whose 
administrator was beaten by the police a few days later. The signal of Voice of America 
and Deutsche Welle were also jammed during the elections. According to Human 
Rights.gov, the Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority asked the editor in chief of a local 
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newspaper called the Weekly Awraman Times to appear in front of a review board and 
accused him of favoring a major opposition party called FORUM.33 The editor in chief 
later resigned. The conditions during the crackdown in 2005 still existed in the country. 
Journalists could not criticize the government under the threat of getting their journal 
suspended or fined or even jailed. There was, therefore, no major coverage of the election 
by independent media in 2010. The election itself was plagued with many irregularities 
such as harassment of journalists. The European Union noticed that insufficient measures 
were taken to protect candidates from harassment and threats. Seventy-two candidates are 
known to have withdrawn their candidacy due to harassment and economic reasons 
Tronvoll (2010). These intimidation practices led most of the journalists in the country to 
practice self-censorship and avoid criticizing the government in place. Disregarding the 
funds spent by USAID and condition provided in aid agreements that the government has 
with them. The Carter Center for Democracy also declined the offer to monitor the 2010 
election in Ethiopia. The EPRDF won a big majority in the Senate, increasing their power 
in the country. This election did not see any post-election violence because the opposition 
leader and the press were afraid of violent repression by the government in light of the 
2005 election example.34.  
The 2010 election proceed in the mood of the postelection crackdown of 
journalist in 2005 with laws passed to restrict media coverage of the election andfund 
provided by international governments attributed to human rights organization in 2008 
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and 2009. The Ethiopian government had a bigger grip on the opposition and the media 
reducing the amount of editorials coming out that would be critical of them. The Addis 
fortune which is the nation’s largest independent English newspaper only published 
article about how the election is taking place and almost no article about individual 
political party or party leaders. They wrote about the electoral committee, possible 
observers of the election. None of the pieces written during that period were negative 
criticizing the government. 
International Accounts of the Election 
International news outlets such as the guardian had more negative coverage 
calling the landslide win of the EPRDF suspicious and fraudulent and accusing the 
Ethiopian of harassing opposition leaders and journalists. The BBC also reported that 
elections fell short of international standard and had doubt on some of the district won by 
the EPRDF that are historic stronghold of the opposition . Voice of America reported that 
the some opposition members were barred from entering the polls, and some pools ran 
out of papers. It is hard for newspapers to follow the election because of the limits the 
EPRDF  put on election monitoring. Looking at the press and human right violation in the 
aftermath of the election let us see the reactions of the United States and USAID. 
United States Monitoring 
The United States criticized irregularities in the election in 2005; however, they 
did not dispute the election results and asked the opposition party to take their seat.35 The 
European Union and the World Bank reacted and withdrew, announcing it was 
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withholding $374 million in budget support to Ethiopia in December 2005 (Abbink 
2006). The United States, however, remained mostly silent and without any major 
reaction. The United Stated renewed their commitment to enhance their relationship with 
Ethiopia in an interview given to BBC by the United States embassy envoys. They also 
stated that they respect countries sovereignty and will not interfere in judicial affairs of 
Ethiopia concerning the jailing of journalists and opposition leaders.36 
Since the United States was aware of the irregularities, a couple of representatives 
drafted a bill H. R. 5680(2005-2006) that was introduced to encourage and facilitate the 
consolidation of security, human rights, democracy, and economic freedom in Ethiopia. 
The role of the bill also, was to support the independence of the judiciary, freedom of the 
press, peacekeeping, capacity building, and economic development in the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia37. The bill also proposed a collaboration with Ethiopia 
in the Global War on Terror. They sought the unconditional release of all political 
prisoners in Ethiopia. Foster stability, democracy, and economic development in the 
region; strengthen United States-Ethiopian relations. 
The law stipulated that it would cut the funds if efforts were not made by the 
government to respect and advance human rights and if the government tries to obstruct 
the United State effort to enhance human right democracy and press freedom. One of the 
specific stipulations of this law was that the print and broadcast media in Ethiopia should 
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operate free from the interference of the Ethiopian government; laws restricting media 
freedom, including sections of the Ethiopian Federal Criminal Code, were to be revised 
so that the licensing of independent radio and television in Ethiopia would be open and 
transparent38.  
This bill was introduced on three occasions and was never passed. However,The 
House Of Representatives, but not the Senate passed the last Introduction H.R.2003 
(2007-2008). Few sanctions were enacted by the United States on the Ethiopian 
government, and one of the main reasons was due to the Bush administration’s propensity 
to create counter-terrorism alliance with authoritarian leaders such as Ethiopia’s Meles 
Zenawi. The Obama administration also disregarded most of the violations committed by 
Ethiopia. They claim to have promoted talk between the government, journalist 
organizations, and opposition parties that led to the liberation of a journalist jailed in the 
2005 election. But their measures to help reinforce independent media law in the country 
had little to no effect39.  
 These counterterrorism alliances forced the United States government to stop any 
strong democratization promotion toward Ethiopia. This factor can explain why they did 
not withdraw their funding when the European Union and the World Bank did. For many 
years, their policy in the Middle East favored stability over democracy. In this case, 
monitoring was not the issue but the fact that the United States had other interests in 
Ethiopia that rendedre the U.S. largely non responsive to violations. According to 
Teshome (2013), the ruling party in Ethiopia, the EPRDF successfully convinced the 
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United States that the country would crumble in instability due to ethnic politics if they 
did not hold power.  Ethiopias practices to undermine democratization in the face of 
foreign observers allegedly started since the independence in 1991 first by imposing 
ethnic federalism to protect minor ethnic groups (Wondwosen and Záhořík 2008).  
Before 2005, there was also an issue with the goals of USAID in Ethiopia. 
According to USAID, their first goal was to eliminate famine in the country and focus on 
social issues. There are also suggestions that democratization and press freedom were not 
the main/ strategic focus of the United States toward Ethiopia during that period (Leicht 
2009). Since the country is very poor, donor countries closed their eyes to human rights 
violations in order to take care of basic needs and the humanitarian crisis, such as 
poverty, and droughts, which occured every couple of years in the early 2000.  
There was also a lack of response from the United States regarding the 2010 
election.40 The 114th Congress wrote a bill to S.Res.432 supporting respect for human 
rights and encouraging inclusive governance in Ethiopia. The bill was placed on the 
Senate’s calendar waiting for further actions. The bill was never passed by the Senate and 
therefore died. 
While this study argues that the Chinese factor is not sufficient to explain the 
variation in press freedom scores among African states, the increasing interest of China in 
Ethiopia might worry the United States. According to Eisenman and Kurlantzick 
(2006:220), China’s bilateral trade with Ethiopia is increasing, althoughthere is an 
imballance between the China-Ethiopian trade that is advantageous for the chinese 




government. In 2005, 12.6 percent of Ethiopia import were coming from china, compared 
to 2.42 percent of Ethiopian export’s going to China. The percentage of the imports 
coming from the United States was 9.5; 4.71 percent of Ethiopia’s exports were going to 
the United States. Chinese exports to sub-Saharan Africa is increasing exponentially. In 
2015, for example China represented 16.54 of all sub-Saharan Africa imports. China was 
the biggest importer to Ethiopia with 26.51percent of all imports; 9.51 of Ethiopia export 
were going to China, representing the biggest non regional exporter. The imports from 
the United States represented 4.11 percent of all import to Ethiopia and 5.53 of the export 
going out of Ethiopia was going to the United States. 41 The United States is still the 
biggest bilateral donor in West Africa, but china is increasing its influence on the 
continent with Interest free loans and aid for infrastructure construction. By increasing 
easily accessible loans and becoming the main trade partner in Ethiopia, china is slowly 
surpassing the United States as the most important aid partner.42 Due to their importance 
in the fight against terrorism, the United States is afraid to lose their influences in the 
Ethiopian governmnent over China.therefore the U.S. is hesistant to  apply sanctions that 
will hurt the country and make it turn to China. After studying the United States response 
to press freedom violations in ethiopia I will now focus on the judicial system in order to 
identify the potential shortcoming judicial institution can have on press freedom in 
Ethiopia. 
The Legal Environment in Ethiopia  
                                                          





Ethiopia Congress is composed of two houses: the House of Federation and 
House of People’s Representatives. Members of the House of Federation are elected by 
individual state assemblies for a period of 5 years. The members of the House of People 
Representative are chosen through direct elections. Ethiopia, being a parliamentary 
republic, has a more independent judiciary, one that can clearly be discerned from the 
legislative and the executive. Linzer and Staton (2015) considered the country to have a 
relative judicial independence a level of 1.43  
There are a couple of problems in the allocation of judicial power in Ethiopia. 
However, The Ethiopian judiciary consists of two branches the federal branch and the 
local branches. There are the regional and federal, first instance, high court and supreme 
courts (Abebe 2013). The Federal Supreme Court has the power to review decisions in 
courts. However, it does not have the power of constitutional review.44In short The 
Supreme Court in Ethiopia cannot interpret the constitution. The judiciary, therefore, has 
limited power in terms of their control over the administration due to a law passed by the 
Congress to reduce the review decisions of administrative agencies (Yemane 2011). The 
Ethiopian House of Federation is the one that can discuss the constitutionality of 
decisions made by the government and the Senate. According to the Ethiopian 
constitution, the House of Federations has the power to interpret the constitution, decide a 
constitutional dispute, and adjudicate the constitutionality of the law (Vibhute 2014). 
There have been discussions about the interpretation of that law in the country that ended 
with the conclusion that courts in the country can interpret the constitution if they believe 
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that the law in front of them is not contrary to the constitution; in the opposite case, 
courts shall refer to the House of Federation (Abebe 2013). Courts can uphold the 
constitutionality of laws but shall refer to the House of Federations if the laws happened 
to be unconstitutional. Abebe (2013) concludes that by granting the power of judicial 
review to an entity that is controlled by political appointees or elected officials, Ethiopia 
cannot ensure the protection of human rights. Judicial review is a complex process in 
Ethiopia. For a law to be constitutionally reviewed it first has to be submitted by the 
courts to the council of constitutional inquiry. The council of constitutional inquiry then 
will review the case and refer the law to the house of federation if need be (Vibhute 
2014). The framework for a review of administrative actions in Ethiopia is also not 
clearly defined by the constitution. Secondly, according to Yemane( 2011), there are 
articles in the constitution of Ethiopia that allow the House of People’s Representative to 
take power away from the judiciary and give it to a special ad hoc court or an 
administrative agency. 
Due to this constitution, the judiciary in Ethiopia does not have a lot of say in 
laws that control freedom of the press and free media. To respond to the infraction 
committed by government institutions during elections such as jailing journalists or 
jamming the signal of some radio or press. For any constitutional review the plaintiff and 
justice department have to refer their cases to the House of Federation that is mainly 
composed of members of the ruling party, the EPRDF. If any law were passed in the 
country that limits press freedom, the judiciary would still be incapable reversing the law 
or even taking the case. Their only role is to uphold laws and judge people according to 
laws passed by the Executive or the Congress. The Executive in this case prossesses most 
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of the powers and can control laws as they please as long as they have the majority in the 
House of Federations. For example, The Ethiopian constitutions under The Constitution 
(under Article 29, 3a) prohibit any form of censorship. However; this law is largely 
disregarded in the country.45  
Capitalizing on the weakness of the country’s judicial institutions, The Ethiopian 
government used its advantage to pass a law that is repressive toward the press. In July 
2008, for example, the Ethiopian government passed a mass media law that gave the 
government the power to initiate defamation suits easily and create heavy financial 
penalties for publishing houses and journalists that do not adhere to guidelines imposed 
by the government.46 It also gave the government the power to deny easily the licenses 
and registration of journalists and media outlets by giving that power to the minister of 
information (Ross 2009).47 Article 43(7) of the same law stipulates that defamation or 
false accusation against any constitutionally elected official judiciary or executive can be 
prosecuted. This law, therefore, seals the mouth of journalists when it comes to criticizing 
government officials (Ross 2009). The vagueness of the definition of defamation and 
false accusation gives a lot of freedom to the government to define it as it pleases. 
In conclusion, the judiciary in the country does not allow for free review of laws 
voted by the Congress, giving almost  total power to the Congress to act as they please 
under the of national security or defamation. These practices impede human rights from 
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being respected in the country. Furthermore In 2009, the Ethiopian Senate passed the 
anti-terror law Proclamation No. 652/2009, that contains a vague definition of terrorism 
and allows the government to jail journalists and citizens easily.48 The law does not 
conform to any international definition of terrorism and violates human rights. A number 
of journalists were illegitimately jailed under that law. The law was not reviewed by the 
House of Federation despite the opposition of human rights activists, journalists, and 
opposition members49. In 2013, for example, the Supreme Court upheld an 18-year 
sentence for a journalist jailed in 2012 under that law50. The Ethiopia NGO law also 
allowing NGO’s to obtain only 10 percent of their revenue from international donors was 
passed in 2009( Nerhanu and Milofsky 2011). Press freedom is critically affected by the 
degree of influence the regime in power has over the judiciary. The strength and 
independence of the judiciary is a proxy for the influence the regime has on the press. 
Where the judiciary has greater independence from the regime/political interests and has 
the ability to protect rights of journalists and a free press, we would expect better press 
freedom scores. This is not the case in Ethiopia and, in combination with the regime’s 
efforts to silence the opposition during elections, it helps to explain the regression in 
press freedom scores despite USAID aid.  
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To conclude this section, economic sanctions are implemented when Ethiopia 
violate human rights because they are a strategic country in the region; Ethiopia is also a 
country considered to be highly unstable because  USAID focus more on humanitarian 
crisis rather than advancing human rights and democratization in the country. The United 
States response to human rights violations in ethiopia confirm my hypothesis that the 
reaction to violation of press freedom is very important. Their interest in ethiopia expand 
on my thypothesis introducing elemenets such as the fights against terrorism and more 
promordial need such as famine. Judicial institutions also allows the governemnt to vote 
for laws that furthers their goals by violating basic human rights. In my next section, I 





In this section, I will evaluate the respect of press freedom during THE 2004 and 
2009 Mozambique election. I will conduct an overview of each election and examine the 
degree to which the independent media is able to work in the country. I will examine the 
degree of responsiveness of the United States to violation during these elections. I will 
additionally examine laws in place in each country that allows press freedom provisions 
to be respected and see if these law played a role in the support or demise of press 
freedom in the country. 
THE MOZAMBIQUE CASE 
Mozambique is a country off the east African coast, a former Portuguese colony 
that gained independence in 1975. The group that drove the independence movement was 
called FRELIMO. After independence, the FRELIMO took control of the country, then 
installed a one-party Marxist system of governance. Their system would soon face the 
resistance of a South African Rhodesian backed group called the RENAMO starting a 
civil war that would last until a peace treaty was signed in 1992. The country’s first 
multi-party election was held in 1994 with both the FRELIMO and the RENAMO
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participating as political parties. The FRELIMO won with a narrow margin taking control 
of the parliament and the country once again. The country integrated into the British 
Commonwealth in 1995. In 2004, the country organized their third election with the 
monitoring of international organizations. Mozambique has a semi-presidential system 
where the president is elected by majority vote on a two round system. The presidential 
election takes place at the same time as the parliamentary elections.51 
The media in Mozambique developed after the peace treaty of 1992; the country 
saw an influx of independent news and radio stations. Since the country was developing, 
radio was the most important communication channel. As of 2010, there are 83-radio 
stations operating in the country.52 There are three daily newspapers in the country and 
nine weekly newspapers.53 
The 2004 elections 
The 2004 elections in Mozambique were criticized for multiple reasons. One 
reason is the fact that the country was very poor and many poll stations ran without 
electricity. Another reason for criticism is the fact that the electoral committee in the 
country (electoral commission (CNE) Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration 
(STAE), Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral) are dominated by party 
nominees and disclosed very little information about the number of polling stations 
(Hanlon and Fox 2010). The electoral commission seats were allocated based on the party 
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position in the parliament, making the majority party the FRELIMO the one with the 
control of the Commission (Ostheimer 2005:7). The fact that 699 result sheets 
representing approximatively 5.4 percent of the polling stations in the country were not 
included due to alleged unresolvable technical mistakes did not help their cause. The final 
result also excluded an additional 881 polling stations representing 6.9 percent of the total 
polling stations in the country without any explanations (Hanlon 2010). 
The number of people registered to vote was also erroneous due to administrative 
mistakes such as duplication of names, names incorrectly written and  assignment of the 
wrong voter numbers. Also, some of the political party observers were barred from some 
polling stations. The districts that were considered as a stronghold for the opposition saw 
voter rolls disappear (Ostheimer 2005:5). Some voters were unable to vote, and the 
RENAMO accused the FRELIMO of ballot stuffing in some regions (Halon and Fox 
2006).International organizations were worried that secrecy surrounding the final vote 
count might shift the vote count for the FRELIMO (Ruigrok 2005:6). In terms of other 
irregularities such as violation of human rights and killing, the election happened without 
major issues. 
Mozambique’s Media Environment  
The media in Mozambique was reported as being biased during the election 
according to the Carter Center for Democracy observers.  The media was biased and in 
some instances forgot to show the coverage of rallies by some nominees.54 Independent 
media in the country were considered professional in their coverage of the election in 
                                                          




most of the cases. Welles (2005) found that news coverage of the election was dominated 
by the two major parties: the FRELIMO and the RENAMO. Aside from these cases, no 
cases of violence or harassment of journalists during the election or related to the election 
were reported by international or national observers. The United State Human Rights 
Watch still notices that journalists were harassed in the country and some jailed earlier 
that year. They also reported that most of the journalists usually practice self-censorship 
but are still able to be critical of the central government without any repercussions.55 
Mozambique, however, is known for journalist harassment. The example of the 
assassination of the investigation journalist Carlos Cardoso, murdered in 2000, is one 
proof. During May of the election year, a journalist working for a private paper 
Faisca was briefly detained and accused of libel after quoting the director of human 
rights saying that the country was corrupt56. There were, however, few events involving 
journalists that raised red flags in the country during the 2004 elections.  
The local newspapers in Mozambique during the 2004 election were reliable 
trusted by international organizations the public. They coverage were seen as unbiased57. 
As an example in a clash between the RENAMO and the FRELIMO over voter 
registration was reported without any bias by the Mozambique News Agency. The 
beating of a radio journalist by RENAMO supporters in October 2004 was also reported 
without any bias58.  The Mozambique News Agency noticed fraud where polls have more 
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than 100 percent turnout and they also noted that the majority of these cases benefited the 
FRELIMO.59 
International Media Accounts of the Election 
International news report on Mozambique election followed the tone of local 
news. There some issues due to the registration of some party leaders in provincial 
elections , issues that were criticized by both the international community and the 
constitutional council.60 BBC and the European Union also reported the fact that some 
polling station had more than 100 percent turnout benefiting the FRELIMO. The 
international news found no major foul play in the elections and the displaying of their 
results going along with local news outlets.61 The incumbent president was also 
considered favorite by both local and international actors due to its good economic 
policies.62  
The 2009 Election 
The 2009 election LIKE the 2004 election happened without any major problems. 
The election saw the emergence of a new political party called the Democratic Movement 
of Mozambique (MDM) that split off of the RENAMO in 2008.The MDM’s message 
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resonate better with the youth. Two days before the election there was an assassination 
attempt on Daviz Simango in Nacala-Porto, a leader of the MDM. the MDM, therefore, 
accused sympathizers of the RENAMO for the coup attempt according to European 
Union report63. The FRELIMO were, however, able to gather more funds for their 
campaign because of their access to administrative resources. The election committee in 
the country (STAE) deployed around 2000 educators in the country to educate the 
population about the vote (Wimpy 2009). There was still however a lot of secrecy around 
the way the electoral commission works. The election saw a very low turnout though a 
little higher than the 2004 election. The incumbent president easily won with 67.51% of 
the votes.64 The 2009 election was also the first election where Mozambicans outside the 
country could vote. The new election rule in the country allows polling stations to be run 
independently with the staff of the polling station selected through a competition of the 
local community’s members. Despite these measure some observers noticed tabulations 
errors and ballot stuffing, however, these infractions were isolated and considered not 
enough to distort the election results.65  
Mozambique’s media environment  
Television and newspapers coverage of the election were better than the 2004 
election, it was less bias66. Moreover, the media coverage was more informative. The 
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airtime given to the FRELIMO was always superior to the other political parties in the 
country. According to the European Union observation mission, the FRELIMO obtained 
more than 45 percent of the coverages67. Their domination in coverage is because the 
FRELIMO controls national radio stations and have more funds for commercials and 
other publicities68. 
The 2009 election is similar to the 2009 election qualified by the press as the most 
peaceful election in the country. The Mozambique news agency was critical of the 
national electoral agency the NEBE because of suspicious voter turnout in some areas 
that were not removed from the general vote count. These irregularities were, however, 
not considered enough to change the result of the vote69. 
International media accounts of the election. 
The international news also went along with the local news qualifying the 2009 
election of peaceful. The BBC also criticizes the NEBE for integrating districts with 
suspicious voter turnout in their final vote count. The international uses usually uses local 
news as sources for their coverage showing the relative freedom of the press in 
Mozambique and the impartiality of journalist. International news during the 2009 
Mozambican election were usually similar to local news with little to no differences. 
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 The violation of press freedom during the election in Mozambique were less than 
the ones in Ethiopia. The country kept a cleaner press freedom record during their 
election compared to the previous years. Mozambique press freedom is actually better 
than Ethiopia’s despite their similarities and despite the fact that both countries receive 
press freedom aid from USAID. This issue is one of the main puzzles we are studying in 
our analysis. Hence for this reason, I will turn to the discussion of the United States 
responsiveness ad judicial institutions for possible explanations. 
United States Monitoring  
The United States reaction to the 2004 election was positive except for the way 
the results were delivered. The Carter Center for Democracy found the election peaceful 
despite some irregularities in the voting list and some technical irregularities.70 In fact, a 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between the United States and Mozambique went into 
effect in March 2005.71 In this case, we see the absence of sanctions. The case of 
Mozambique during this election is more peaceful compared to the 2005 Ethiopian 
elections. Despite all the irregularities, the international actors considered the results 
valid. Mozambique actions in the case of the 2004 election are what we were supposed to 
expect from a country under the supervision of international actors. There were few 
events, and the media was able to do their work. Countries under high monitoring are 
supposed to act accordingly to conditionalities especially when the bilateral treaties 
between the monitored country and the United States are on the line. Mozambique is 
highly dependent on international aid. The United States helped the country go through 
                                                          
70Observing 2004 Mozambique election final report  https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2218.pdf 




war and financed the peace process that led to the first elections72. There seems to be a 
respect of press freedom provisions in the country without major issues. In 2004 only 1.4 
percent of Mozambique imports were coming from China, the United States represented 
2.28 percent of the exports coming in Mozambique the same year. In 2015, import from 
China were 12.6 percent compared to 2.47 coming from the United States. The biggest 
trade partner of Mozambique is South Africa representing on average 30 percent of the 
import in Mozambique.73 The United States, china is the biggest trade partner in Ethiopia 
and the second biggest trade partner in Mozambique. 
The comparison between both election periods offers a glimpse in the explanation 
of why media directed assistance works in some countries and not others. These 
explanations, however, are still insufficient especially because the election in 
Mozambique was more peaceful than the Ethiopian election despite both countries being 
anocracies. The United States noticed the shortcoming of the 2004 and 2009 election, 
however they still fall short of punishing the country74. Their response might be due to 
the fact that the transgressions in Mozambique were minimal compared to the one in 
Ethiopia. What other factors might explain the fact that the Mozambican government 
respect press freedom more than the Ethiopian government.  In the next, I will focus my 
analysis on the judiciary and the process of judicial review in both countries. 
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The Legal Environment in Mozambique 
Mozambique has a semi-presidential regime with the executive, legislative and 
judiciary that are supposed to be separate, however, the fact more often is that they are 
not. The legal system in Mozambique is a civil law. The judiciary is separated in civil and 
criminal courts. Judges are usually appointed by other judges with the exception of the 
Supreme Court members. The supreme court is composed of 7 judges appointed by the 
president of Mozambique on the advice of the Superior Council of the Judicial System 
and 18 elected judges 8 of whom are substitutes (Trindade, Pedroso 2006). 75  
According to Linzer and Staton (2015), they have a de facto judicial 
independence of zero, which mean that they have no judicial independence in practice76. 
In general, the judicial system in Mozambique has two big problems. First, the judiciary 
is plagued by corruption and, secondly, by the interference of the ruling party, the 
FRELIMO. Corruption of the judiciary takes the form of buying and selling of verdicts, 
losing evidence and case files while paid to do so, intimidation of witnesses, and freeing 
key suspects.77 The Superior Council of the Justice Magistrature (CSMJ) has the power to 
review judges performance and if need be punish or promote them. The World Bank did 
not record extensive manipulation or nepotism in the appointment of judges as that is 
usually done based on merits78.  
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The government of Mozambique, like the one in Ethiopia, has provisions that 
respect freedom of the press, and according to the United States Human Rights Report, 
unlike Ethiopia, these provisions are generally respected despite the corruption and 
government interference79. This section will assess judicial review of constitutional laws 
in the country to identify why the government seems to respect press freedom laws 
despite the significant problems associated with the judicial system. 
 The constitution of 1990 in Mozambique led to the introduction of the 
constitutional council to check the constitutionality of laws enacted in the country. The 
council, however, was not created until 2003 along with a new law that clarified the way 
they should be elected. Before 2003, the role of the constitutional council in the country 
was taken care of by the Supreme Court. The national assembly nominates members of 
the constitutional council. The court is composed of five members elected for five years 
renewable.80 Due to the threat made by the RENAMO to boycott elections if changes 
were not made to the electoral system, the Mozambican parliament started changes in 
order to strengthen the accountability and parliamentary system in the country. These 
changes led to the introduction of a bill to set up the constitutional council as it was 
written in the constitution.81 The 2003 law took action to ensure the independence of the 
members of the council and to make sure that the members are not politicized. 
Constitutional judges verify the constitutionality of laws and actions taken by members of 
the government and of laws voted in the general assembly of the country. The new 
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constitution also stipulates that the interpretation of the constitution shall always be in 
accordance with the universal declaration of human rights.82 Both the government and 
opposition groups can submit cases in front of the constitutional council. For a case to be 
submitted to the constitutional council, a third of the member of Parliament have to vote, 
or 2000 citizens’ complaints have to be submitted. 
The constitutional judges in Mozambique, despite the fact that they are appointed 
proportionally by the Senate, have a great deal of independence compared to other judges 
in the country and have taken action both for and against the party in power. Due to their 
relative independence compared to the other courts the constitutional council has the 
power to impeach the creation of any law that will go against the constitution and violate 
human rights. The constitutional council can also stop any law that will violate press 
freedom and freedom of information. In 2001, for example, Mozambique created their 
first Coordinating Council for Legality and Justice composed of members of the ministry 
of justice and the judiciary. In 2003 they expanded on that and created a strategic plan83. 
The constitutional judges can judge the constitutionality of both a priori and concrete 
laws. 
The judiciary in Mozambique, despite it not being perfect and the corruption and 
government influence on judges and decisions, can find some redemption through their 
constitutional courts and their council for legality and justice. These courts can perform 
with a better degree of independence subsequently preventing the government from 
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creating and implementing unconstitutional laws especially ones that go against press 
freedom. There are a set of rules in the constitution such as: the Constitutional Council 
cannot exercise any functions in the organs of political parties and political associations, 
or functions associated with them, nor develop activities of police-public nature. The 
status resulting from membership in a political party or association, by members of the 
Constitutional Council, was suspended for constitutional judges (article 17).84 The 
council can explain why the government has a greater respect for press freedom despite 
having a heavily corrupted judiciary. The Mozambique also has administrative courts that 
will review any administrative action taken by the government. The Mozambican law 
also provides mechanisms to investigate executive misconducts such as the ad hoc 
committees of inquiry and the petition committee. 85 Mozambique however has a libel law 
which is common for commonwealth countries and countries like the United States and 
Ireland. However while libel is more likely to lead to self-censorship from journalists 
(Summerville et al 2016:131). This libel law however does not always give advantage to 
politicians. In June 2010 a journalist Jose Da Gama was found guilty of libel against a 
RENAMO member of the parliament that sued for damages and was charged for non-
cooperation with the justice because he refused to disclose his sources. Because of the 
constitution that permits the protection of professional independence and confidentiality, 
he filed for appeal and got a reduction of sentence (Freedom House 2010). In 2013, a 
journalist and an economist were arrested for posting an open letter on Facebook 
criticizing the president of Mozambique. Both were judged and found innocent based on 
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article 48 of the constitution that highlights the freedom of expression and press 
freedom86. Moreover, the deputy state attorney in Mozambique criticized laws that 
identify defamation by a journalist as criminal law and not civil law and vowed to take 
action to get rid of it in 201187. 
The judicial review in Mozambique serves as a way to control judicial decision and laws 
passed that could go against article 48 of the constitution on press freedom. In 2008 a bill 
was passed to create a new human rights commission in the country, however the 
opposition refer the bill to the constitutional council because the bill stipulated that the 
head of the human rights commission shall be elected by the president. The constitutional 
council therefore ruled against the bill and stripped that part from it.88 It serves as a check 
on the government in case they want to unlawfully try journalist or pass laws that will be 
detrimental to press freedom in the country. As a result, the country passed in 2012 the 
access to information act in 2014 that will allow for greater transparency from 
government officials.89 In conclusion, Mozambique judicial systems create checks that 
discourage the legislative and the executive from harassing journalists or misuse the libel 
law in place in the country. Compare to Ethiopia’s constitutional review system that is 
politicized, the accessibility of the review in Mozambique is also easier than the one in 
Ethiopia who has a special council that judges if the law should be submitted to the house 
of federation for review council that is also politicized (Vibhute 2014). In Mozambique 
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an inquiry by 2000 people or the president of the senate the president of the republic and 
two third of the senate can ask for a constitutional review90. 
                                                          






 I tried to understand why countries receiving assistance from USAID have 
different outcomes. I introduced explanations that seem to explain some of the puzzle but 
not fully such as democratization, income per capita, and countries dependence on aid, 
the influence of China and the consistency in their aid acceptance. I then introduced two 
new hypothesis I used in my analysis that are response to press freedom violation and 
independence of the judiciary. My case comparison led me to two conclusions about the 
importance of constitutional review and the U.S. reaction to press freedom violations. 
First, in the analysis of the United States’ reaction to press freedom violation during 
election years, this research showed that the United States is reticent to punish Ethiopia 
when they violate press freedom or other human rights laws. The reason is that Ethiopia 
is strategic for the United States in the fight against terrorism and because of the fear that 
China will take over if funds are frozen or retracted as punishment. In a testimony in 
front of the Senate foreign relation agency, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development Assistant Administrator for Africa Earl Gast acknowledged the Ethiopian 
government effort to restrict press freedom and undermine political opposition, evidently 
by their brutal takeover in the 2005 elections. However he also maintained that the 
United States should maintain a close working relationship with the Ethiopian 
government because they are a key partner in the fights against terrorism in east African 
and the Middle East and also in promoting food security and providing peacekeepers in  
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difficult areas such as the Darfur and fighting  al Shebab in somalia91.  My hypothesis 
covers Chinese aid and loans, however, it did not cover Chinese trade to Africa. 
Mozambique china relations are increasing like everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa, 
however China is not yet the main importer of goods in the country, that role belongs to 
South Africa. China is now the second biggest trade partner in Mozambique. The United 
States remain the biggest bilateral aid donor to Mozambique, but the rise of china’s trade 
in the country couple with their loans is weakening the grasp the U.S. have in these 
countries. Since Mozambique is a less strategic country especially in the fights against 
terrorism, its relation with the United States are different from Ethiopia’s. As an example 
the United States made it known to the Mozambican government that it is reviewing the 
annual $400 million in aid, they give to Mozambique in lights the scandal indicating that 
the country was hiding $1 billion in debt. In the aftermath of that fiasco, the Mozambican 
government is turning to china for financial help.  Other competing aid interests also 
affected USAID monitoring. Due to the poverty and famine issues Ethiopia was faced 
with, USAID assistance was focused on addressing these issues, and diverting attention 
from human rights issues or abuses. The USAID strategic budget for Ethiopia from 2001 
to 2005 for example, mentions the growing drought and famine in the country and 
prioritized food security, heath services and basic education over democratization and 
civil society. By 2009, the strategic plan of USAID was prioritizing peace and security 
over good governance and civil society. The report for the fiscal year of 2005 also 
indicates that 21 percent of 71 million people were requiring food and emergency 
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assistance.  This does not mean that the U.S. entirely overlooked press freedom 
violations, however. As previously noted, the House of Representative sought to pass 
laws that would make the country increase their respect for human rights and press 
freedom. However, since the Bush and Obama administration focused their efforts on 
maintaining peace and increasing antiterrorist efforts, there has been less pressure on 
Ethiopia to respect press freedom laws as a requirement for USAID aid. As an example a 
law was passed that restricted the amount of funds NGO’s get from international donors 
to 10%.the law only allows only Ethiopians organizations to work in the domain of 
human rights. The U.S. government had a weak response to that law saying that it might 
restrict the U.S. assistance to civil society organizations which was part of their strategic 
plan for Ethiopia. The same law passed in Zimbabwe was labelled by the United States as 
an assault on civil society and an attempt to block political discussion (Carothers and 
Brechenmacher 2014). The government of Ethiopia seems to know that and use that to 
their advantage in their relations with the United States. As a result, the United States did 
not stop funding going to Ethiopia in response to the 2005 election.  
Other the other hand, compared to Ethiopia, Mozambique seems to be the good 
child of international aid agreements; their elections are not perfect. However, they occur 
without much conflict and are more democratic than the one in Ethiopia. However, due to 
the peacefulness of their election, it was difficult to compare both. The fact that no 
sanctions or threats were made is understandable in Mozambique because of how their 
elections were organized. The USAID strategic plan in Mozambique in 2004-2005 
focused more on good governance, human rights, economic development and aids rather 
than famine.  Their new strategic plan for the period of 2009 to 2014 also put more 
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emphasis on democratic governance and economic development.92As USAID main 
strategy in the country, the Mozambican government is well aware of the goals, and they 
look to please their biggest aid donor. The United States also has harsher responses to 
press freedom violations in countries that are not important strategic allies (Carothers and 
Brechenmacher 2014).Mozambique might be leaning lessons from Zimbabwe that saw 
the United States impose economic sanction due to the non-respect of press freedom and 
rule of law in the country. Ethiopia however did not see similar sanctions applied to 
them93.  The United States is still Mozambique’s biggest aid partner, like in the Ethiopian 
case. China’s influence in Mozambique is growing, but it is not as important as its 
influence in Ethiopia. In terms of loans from 2001 to 2014, China gave $12 billion in 
loans to Ethiopia and only 1.9 billion to Mozambique.  The total amount of aid coming 
from USAID during the same period to Ethiopia was 7 billion. The total amount of aid 
coming from USAID to Mozambique was 3 billion.   
In sum the finding suggest that it may be the case that there are fewer or less 
drastic violations because of closer monitoring by the U.S. government. Countries may 
have less restrictive of press freedom because they know the U.S. is monitoring them and 
is prioritizing democracy and human rights in the country over other issues. Also, the 
finding suggest that it may be the case that the U.S. is a more important aid partner in 
Mozambique compared to the Ethiopia case even though Ethiopia receives more total 
U.S, aid, which renders Mozambique more reliant on its relationship with the U.S. 
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Hence, the nature of the relationship between press freedom and monitoring by the U.S. 
government is more difficult to trace. It does suggest, however, that incentives to monitor 
countries and their commitment to aid conditionalities are shaped by the nature of other 
ties such as trade and security concerns which will make the monitoring body or state 
more or less likely to ensure that the receiving countries abides by the conditionality 
requirements. My next analysis of individual institutions, however, provides me with a 
better explanation of the differences between both countries. 
Beyond issues of monitoring and the stakes of holding a country accountable to 
aid conditionalities and press freedom stipulations, this analysis also highlights the 
importance of domestic institutions in shaping restrictions on press freedom. Comparing 
the judicial review in both countries highlighted important interaction that can heavily 
influence the effort to improve press freedom and human rights. The de facto and de jure 
independence of the judiciary matters because the Ethiopian constitution allows for less 
separation of powers of the judiciary and the executive than the Mozambican 
constitution. However, the Ethiopian constitution by not allowing the judiciary to conduct 
constitutional review makes the review process political giving whoever controls the 
Senate power over judicial review. The Mozambican constitution also makes it easy to 
the population and the Senate to submit a case for constitutional review. However, while 
both judiciaries are corrupted, but the Mozambican constitution took measures to make 
sure judges apply the law impartially and respect the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
 Comparing the judiciary highlighted the importance of institutions in African 
states and the role they play in shaping the degree to which aid conditions such as press 
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freedom are respected. Simple measures of democracy that aggregate measures of 
institutions and respect for  such as Polity IV or Freedom House are unable to get at the 
domestic role played by certain institutions in shaping press freedom. Linzer, and Staton 
(2015) for example classified Ethiopia’s judicial Independence as better than 
Mozambique’s. My argument is that these measures of judicial independence do not take 
into account the full scope of the judiciary in both countries.  That is, in assessing why 
some countries do a better job at respecting aid conditionalities, one has to look not only 
at the monitoring of aid and the relationship between the aid receiver and the giving 
country, but also the institutions especially the judiciary that shape the ability of regimes 
to infringe on press freedom. Both Ethiopia and Mozambique are good case studies. 
 After my analysis, for further research, I identified that one factor country do not 
have is oil. Oil is a very important commodity and it might affect the way the United 
States react to press freedom violations too. In countries such as the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, the presence of other mineral resources might also affect the United State 
relationship with the country and their competition with China in order to obtain such 
resources. The bad record of rentier countries such as Angola, the democratic republic of 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, the republic of Congo and strategically placed 
countries such as Uganda may be explained by these relationships; this requires further 
exploration. All these countries are either big oil exporter or strategic allies of the United 
States in their region. It may also explain the poor press freedom record of North African 
countries before the 2011 revolution and even today in Egypt. The constitutional court in 
Mozambique can judge the constitutionality of both a priory and concrete laws, however 
the house of federation can only judge the constitutionality of already concrete laws 
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making it difficult for human rights to be respected especially due to the politization of 
the house of federations in Ethiopia. A high dependence on USAID aid coupled with a 
situation in a less strategic place and a fairly transparent judicial review system may be 
able to explain why countries such as Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Niger have and historically 
higher press freedom scores. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, I tried to identify the reason why media directed assistance work in 
some countries and not in others. After eliminating possible explanations made in former 
researchers such as democratization. Gnp per capita, the Chinese interference, and 
dependence on aid I conducted a case comparison between Ethiopia and Mozambique. I 
compared both countries based on the response they got from international actors and 
based on judicial. The content analysis of the press in Ethiopia showed the repression 
they receive from the national government and USAID disregard of these violations.   I 
also found that interest of the United States could change based on situations such as the 
fights against terrorism or extreme famine in a country. The rationale being a most 
similar case study id to identity factors that could not be seen using broad indexes or 
large N analysis. This study expanded on the explanation of the effectiveness of aid 
conditions using the biggest aid donor in Africa, USAID. Judicial review in both country 
is complex, but the accessibility of the review and the impartiality of the organism 
reviewing decisions can highly influence the respect of press freedom. The case of 
Mozambique shows that even with the existence of laws such as libel laws, a country can 
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still have a moderately free press if the judiciary allows it. There is a need compare these 
process in all African countries to further understand the generalizability of this 
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Press freedom 2001 2016 
Free 8 3 
Partly free 16 26 





Democratization( polity IV) 2001 2015 
democracy 19.5% 41 
Anocracy 70.7% 47.8 
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